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CURRENT LEGISLATION
INSURANCE IN URBAN CORE AREAS: AN ANALYSIS
OF RECENT STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Very few of the proposed solutions for urban poverty and blight' have
directed attention to the difficulty confronting residents and property owners
within the urban core area in procuring property insurance. 2 This comment
will attempt to delineate the problem and to give special focus to the impor-
tance of an effective insurance system and to the current lack of insurance in
the core areas. Various responses to the problem, past and present, will then
be examined in depth, and particular emphasis will be devoted to the Federal
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 3 and several state
remedial statutes." Finally, an original scheme will be proposed as a solution
combining the most effective features of existing efforts.
1 See, e.g., M. Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (1965) ;
H. Humphrey, War on Poverty (1964) ; Shostak, An Overview of Current Administration
Policy, in New Perspectives on Poverty 30 (IV. Gomberg & A. Shostak ed, 1965) ; Gans,
Some Proposals for Government Policy in an Automating Society, 30 The Correspondent
Jan.-Feb., 1964, at 74; Myrdal, The War on Poverty, The New Republic, Feb. 8, 1964,
at 26; The Voice of the Ghetto, A Report by the Massachusetts State Advisory Committee
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights (July, 1967). The foregoing books, articles,
and report are not a complete bibliography of proposals but are listed merely to give
the general direction and orientation of proposed poverty reforms.
2 See generally, Meeting the Insurance Crisis of our Cities, A Report by the Presi-
dent's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Advisory Panel] ; Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil Demonstrations,
7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 706 (1966) ; Note, Riot Insurance, 77 Yale L.J. 541 (1968) ;
N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1967, at 42, col. 8.
The Advisory Panel has concluded, after months of exhaustive research and investiga-
tion in which systematic surveys were conducted in Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Newark,
Oakland and St. Louis, that the lack of property insurance pervades not only urban
core areas, but also towns and cities throughout the United States outside the urban
core areas. The survey disclosed, for example, that more than 35% of the businessmen
surveyed in the Roxbury section of Boston, an urban core area, had no fire insurance
while 74% had no burglary and theft insurance. Advisory Panel at 2-3.
3 Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XI and XII (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2894. Page numbers are cited throughout to the advanced sheets.
4 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, 1968 Cal. Laws
(Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026 (West 1968)). District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-448, tit. XII, II 1201-13 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909-15.
Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, 1968 III. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13 (Smith-Hurd 1968)).
Urban Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv.
588 (1968)). P.A. 262, 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497
(1968)). Ch. 129, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436 (1968)). New York Fire and Ex-
tended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, 1968 NY, Laws
(N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190 (McKinney 1968)). Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, 1968 Pa.
Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592 (1968)).
The statutes of Delaware, Virginia and Puerto Rico will not be discussed.
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1I. THE NECESSITY OP PROPERTY INSURANCE
The necessity of property insurance would seem to be self-evident. With-
out property insurance, the assets of individuals and corporations are exposed
to the risk of loss from natural and man-made hazards beyond their controls
Also, to a great extent, the stability and growth of private enterprise depend
upon the maintenance of reasonable and adequate property insurance cover-
age.° If a company is unable to insure its property against fire and other
perils, it must retain sufficient liquid assets to pay for losses when they occur.
This requirement restricts a company's ability to make new capital invest-
ments out of retained earnings or to declare and pay regular dividends. Ade-
quate property insurance, on the other hand, allows a company to pay
dividends or to invest its surplus in new capital projects, free from the possi-
bility that a fire or other catastrophe might impair or destroy its solvency.
The necessity of adequate insurance protection is magnified in urban core
areas, for these areas are attempting to develop new industry, housing, and
retail outlets.
Merchants and entrepreneurs are naturally reluctant to invest substan-
tial sums of money in the core areas when the distinct possibility persists
that insurance will not be available as a risk-shifting device, or available only
at exorbitant rates.' Self-insurance, insuring one's own property by setting
aside a fund for that purpose, although a possible alternative, is not very
helpful. It requires a vast amount of capital which can be put in restricted
reserves for immediate use in the event of a loss. Such risk retention by urban
core industries and retail establishments would be suicidal, for many of these
business are marginal even with adequate insurance. 8
 The prospect of self-
insurance is certainly no incentive for private enterprise to expand its role in
the development of new industry and housing within the urban core area.
The necessity of adequate insurance coverage within the urban core area
is manifested also by the effect of the absence of such insurance on the eco-
nomic and social well-being of these areas. 9
 The insurance problem cannot be
examined in a vacuum. Any proposal for insurance reform must consider the
fact that the lack of insurance is integrally related to other urban problems
such as lack of financing, unemployment, and physical deterioration.'°
If a corporation or other business is interested in the construction of a
building or store in the urban core area, it is imperative that banks and other
financial institutions provide the necessary funds. However, these institutions
are unwilling to accept mortgages on property unless the property is ad-
equately covered by insurance. 11
 Further, even though coverage has been
5 Advisory Panel at 1.
9 Ch.•.29, § 1, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436 (1968)).
7 Advisory Panel at 2.
8
 Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 542.
9
 "Without insurance, buildings arc left to deteriorate ; services, goods, and jobs
diminish. Efforts to rebuild our nation's inner cities cannot move forward. Communities
without insurance are communities without hope." Advisory Panel at 1.
10
 Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 23, N.J. Leg. Serv. 635-36 (1967).
11 Advisory Panel at 2.
The major types of property insurance are: (1) fire insurance, (2) vandalism and
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acquired and the mortgage has been placed, the threat of disorders may lead to
a subsequent cancellation 12 or non-renewalla of the policy or to an increase in
premium rates." Once coverage is cancelled or not renewed, foreclosure of
the mortgage on the property is usually imminent.1 ' This result in turn leads
to a sale of the foreclosed property at a deflated price, for prospective buyers
are not likely to invest great sums in property lacking insurance coverage.
Once this process is set in motion, an acceleration of physical deterioration
within the urban core area occurs because of the impracticality of costly
repairs on uninsured property. The cycle closes with a further constriction of
insurance coverage, for deteriorated property enhances the risk of loss from
fire and other perils. Businessmen, entrepreneurs and real estate investors
are unwilling to assume such high risks and consequently will not undertake
substantial capital projects within the afflicted area.'°
The lack of insurance coverage inhibits the expansion of existing core
industries and businesses." Companies will defer expansion unless adequate
and reasonable insurance coverage is forthcoming. In fact, the cancellation of
insurance or the imposition of exorbitant rates will cause retail businesses to
contract their inventory in the expectation of minimizing losses if a riot or
fire should occur. Naturally such a vigilant attitude is not conducive to the
maintenance of a healthy and productive economic climate within the urban
core area.
As businesses contract or close down because of the lack of finance,
workers become unemployed. Job opportunities, already insufficient, diminish
so that inhabitants of the urban core area must seek new jobs elsewhere. In
the interim, incomes of families decrease or disappear so that it becomes diffi-
cult for the families to maintain their former economic status. As incomes
and property values decrease, tax revenue from the area diminishes. City and
state poverty programs, already hampered by a lack of funds, will be fur-
ther burdened unless new fiscal programs are developed to amass the neces-
sary capital. This burden will undoubtedly lead to the imposition of higher
taxes with its concomitant dampening effects on the private sector of the eco-
nomy. In short, then, in the absence of genuine reform the ongoing lack of
malicious mischief, (3) extended coverage endorsement which provides protection against
damages arising from wind storm, hail, explosion, riot, riot attending a strike, civil com-
motion, aircraft, vehicles and smoke, and (4) burglary and theft insurance. Advisory Panel
at 18-20. For an example of a standard fire policy, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:36-5.20
(1963) ; N.Y. Ins. Law, § 168(6) (McKinney 1966).
12 Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil Demonstrations, supra note 2, at 706.
13 Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 23, N.J. Leg. Serv. 635 (1967).
14 Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 543.
Several states have statutory restrictions on the power of insurance companies to
cancel insurance or increase rates. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 187(c) (1958)
(procedural restrictions on cancellation) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:29A-7 (1963) (restrictions
on premium rates).
15 Wall Street Journal, Aug, 31, 1965, at 6, col. 2.
16 See ch. 129, § 1, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436 (1968)) ; Assembly Con-
current Resolution No. 23, N.J. Leg. Serv. 635 (1967) ; H.R. Rep. No. 1585, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3137-38; Advisory Panel at 1.
17 Advisory Panel at 1.
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property insurance in the urban core will continue as a major cause in the
widening cycle of urban decay. 18
III. CAUSES OF LACK OF PROPERTY INSURANCE
Before discussion of the several solutions devised to combat the lack of
property insurance in the urban code area, it is necessary to examine the
various causes underlying the problem. Basically, the response of insurance
companies to underwriting risks within core areas has been dictated by one
overriding factor: underwriting insurance in urban core areas is not con-
sidered profitabIe.'° Since an insurance company exists for the benefit of the
stockholders if it is a stock company, or of the policyholders if it is a mutual
company, a wise underwriting policy militates against insuring risks with a
high loss ratio. 2° It must be emphasized that the basis upon which under-
writing decisions are made is not only the unprofitability of a line of insur-
ance in fact, but also the consideration or assumption that certain coverage
will be unprofitable. 2 '
Since property insurance in the urban core areas is generally considered
unprofitable by insurance companies, its marketing by agents and brokers is
very limited."" There are very few insurance agents within these areas and
those who do market insurance there are severely restricted by well defined
rules of exclusion 23
 Since agents are usually paid on a commission basis, and
since they have only a limited amount of time to procure new policies, they
will obviously maximize their earnings by concentration of their efforts on
the less time-consuming and more lucrative business. 24
 It often requires a
gargantuan effort by an agent before he can successfully place a certain risk
from within the urban core area. 2° Such patience and perseverance is rarely
forthcoming from agents primarily concerned with large commission fees. The
18
 Although the lack of property insurance is not the only cause of urban proverty,
it is a significant factor, the alleviation of which is essential if other poverty reforms are
to be successful.
19 "Although the property-liability insurance industry in the underwriting practices
is saying that inner city business generally is bad and to be avoided, it cannot show the
extent to which this judgment is accurate." Advisory Panel at 32 (emphasis added).
20
 Underwriting profits are necessary to attract capital, to provide greater financial
safety, and to support growth. The response of insurance companies to low profits on a
particular line has been to raise rates, establish more stringent underwriting standards, or
to withdraw coverage completely. Advisory Panel at 40.
21
 Fire Insurance in Congested Areas, A Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
(State of New York Insurance Department, March 7, 1967). See also Advisory Panel
at 32. Thus, the unprofitability of insuring risks within certain urban core areas might
actually be an unwarranted assumption, unsubstantiated by underwriting statistics. The
Advisory Panel has recommended that each state institute a more detailed recordkeeping
system so that more reliable information will be available when companies make under-
writing decisions. Advisory Panel at 94.
22 Advisory Pane! at 25.
23
 Id. Insurance companies often distribute underwriting materials which prohibit
agents and brokers from insuring property if it is located within certain areas of the
city called "red-line" or "knock-out" areas. Id. at 6, 30.
24 See Id. at 5.
25 See Id.
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few agents who do attempt to place risks from these areas are often "re-
warded" with immediate termination of the agency agreement. 26
An underlying cause of the problem, and one integrally related to un-
derwriting decisions regarding property within the core, is the unavailability
or the high cost of reinsurance for risks located within these areas?' Reinsur-
ance, insurance under a contract by which the first insurer relieves himself
from a part or from all of the risks and devolves it upon another insurer, is
generally utilized by insurance companies to stabilize underwriting results, to
protect capital, and to enlarge their capacity to provide coverage for poten-
tially catastrophic losses.28 One of the instrumental factors inducing an in-
surance company to provide coverage for high risks is its ability to utilize
the reinsurance market, since a part or all of the risks will be borne by the
reinsurer.
Since reinsurance is primarily offered by private enterprise, the same fac-
tors which inhibit direct insurers from undertaking a more extensive under-
writing program in urban core areas also prevent reinsurers from entering the
market." The demands of the owners of reinsurance companies often conflict
with the need for reinsurance of risks within the urban core area. If a line of
insurance is considered unprofitable and beset by high risks, a reinsurance
company will constrict its coverage.'" The tightening of the reinsurance
market has led to the concurrent constriction of the primary insurance
market.31-
The difficulty of obtaining insurance and/or reinsurance for risks located
within the core areas is not a recent phenomenon:32 The insurance problem
has existed in urban core areas for many decades. But the widespread civil
disorders of the past few years were needed to dramatize the magnitude of
the problem." After the disorders, insurance companies underwriting within
the urban core areas found it necessary to constrict further the amount of
coverage34 or to withdraw completely from the riot-affected areas. 35 This
activity caught the attention of the legislature. However, an alleviation of the
threat of riots will not necessarily solve the problem, since the problem ante-
dates the occurrence of civil disorders.
IV. NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR A PROPERTY INSURANCE PLAN
A number of substantive factors must be considered in the assessment of
the potential effectiveness and viability of any insurance plan for the urban
26 Id.
27 Id. at 4, 38-39.
28 Id. at 36.
29 Cf. id. at 37-38.
30 See id. 4-5, 35-38; Hearings Before the President's National Advisory Panel on
Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas 72-73 (1967) (remarks of David J. Dykhouse).
31 Advisory Panel at 39-40.
32 Id. at 1, 5.
33 The riots and civil disturbances which followed in the aftermath of the assassina-
tion of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. involved more than 110 cities and resulted in
more than $45,000,000 of insured losses. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1968, at 37, col. 2; N.Y.
Times, April 13, 1968, at 13, col. 3.
34 Advisory Panel at 3.
WI Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 541.
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core areas. First, the burden or risk of loss must be spread among a sufficiently
large number of persons so that a particular loss will not affect the solvency
of any individual or company." The efficacy of an insurance plan depends
upon its ability to spread the risk of loss and to shift the risk of loss from
those who cannot afford the incidence of loss to those who are able to absorb
losses if and when they occur. One common method of spreading the risk is
the use of reinsurance.
Second, an insurance scheme must consider the deterrent effect which it
will have on the particular insured risk. 37 Since many of the insured losses
within urban core areas have resulted from man-made causes, an efficient in-
surance plan should provide a measure of deterrence to prevent future out-
breaks of civil disturbances. Part of the burden should fall on those best
positioned to curb these disorders, that is, the taxpayers of the municipality
where the disorder occurs. It is hoped that this financial burden will encour-
age the taxpaying class to alleviate the conditions within the urban core which
foment riots and to control disturbances when they do occur. The difficulty
arises because those in a position to deter future outbreaks are seldom the people
that have the financial capacity to absorb the risk of loss. Municipal budgets
are already inadequate to cope with the burgeoning demands of urban devel-
opment, let alone the cost of reimbursing property owners for riot damage."
The optimum solution is to balance the factors of risk dispersion and riot
deterrence so as to maximize economic and social benefits." In the short run,
it is possible for an insurance scheme to concentrate on the element of spread-
ing, but any long range plan must also consider deterrence. If civil distur-
bances continue unabated, the cost of insurance premiums will continue to
soar, and will thereby make it inexpedient to purchase property insurance.
Third, an insurance plan must provide incentives for an owner to im-
prove the condition of his property. It is disfunctional to provide insurance
coverage for any property, regardless of its condition. If the property does not
meet certain minimum standards of insurability, it should not be covered by
insurance:" In this regard, it is critical to emphasize that insurability of a
36 Cf. Advisory Panel at 11. See also Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 541 -42.
37 See Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 542, 547, 555-58.
38 The cities are highly dependent upon property taxes to provide the bulk of its
revenue. The problem with this source is that property taxes are relatively unresponsive
to changes in income. As the cost of providing public services has greatly increased, tax
revenues have increased only slightly. Another problem is that population shifts in the
post-war period from the cities to the residential suburbs has left many cities with a
shrinking tax base. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 393
(N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
39
 It might be possible to utilize the techniques of linear programming (i.e., a
theory of maximization of a large number of variables subject to constraints) to discover
the optimum solution. However, since spreading and deterrence are only two of the
factors involved and since there are a number of other variables, the solution might be
theoretically optimum but realistically below the optimum. The scope of this comment is
too limited to explore the possible construction of mathematical and statistical models.
For a concise and accurate explanation of linear programming techniques, see Henderson
& Sidaifer, Mathematical Programming, in New Decision-Making Tools for Managers 30
(E. Bursk and J. Chapman ed. 1963).
4° Standards of insurability should be set either by statute, by regulation by the
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risk should not be determined by environmental factors, for these are beyond
the control of the property owner. 41 However, if a property hazard can be
corrected, the issuance of insurance should be conditioned upon its correction.
Fourth, an insurance plan should offer incentives to businesses seriously
interested in capital investment within the urban core area. The plan must at-
tempt to remove the stigma currently attached to ownership of core property
and to make the area as attractive a location for investment as other areas of
the city. To this end, the plan should allow the property owner to insure his
property to the fair market value. Also, the premium rates must be reasonable
and the insurance coverage must be readily accessible. Finally, there must be
certain procedural safeguards in the plan to assure all property owners of
impartial and fair dealings with insurance companies.
V. PRIOR SOLUTIONS TO TILE INSURANCE PROBLEM IN THE URBAN CORE AREA
This section will examine the various solutions used in the past and being
used presently in some states to combat the insurance problem. The most ob-
vious, and certainly the most simplistic, "solution" is to let the loss fall on the
person or property damaged 9 2 This result is not satisfactory in the case of
urban core buildings, for the burden will ultimately fall upon the slum dwellers
themselves through the incidence of higher rents and prices?' The present ill
feeling, between the residents on the one hand and the landlords and mer-
chants on the other, will be intensified. Instead of deterring rioting and civil
unrest, this arrangement would probably contribute to the incidence of dis-
turbances as the residents experience an unremittting sense of exploitation.
Further, this system provides an insufficient spreading of losses. The losses will
be borne by the affected merchants and their customers. Marginal businesses
might very well become insolvent, for it is unlikely that higher prices could
absorb the full impact of the losses. Finally, a system placing the loss on the
property damaged offers no incentive for capital investments within the urban
core area.
A second solution to the problem is exemplified by the common law and
statutes of a number of jurisdictions which shift the burden of loss to the
rioters themselves. Generally, an individual is liable in tort for any damages
which he willfully perpetrates upon a person" or upon his property. 45
 Some
states even allow recovery against a participant in a riot on the basis of a
conspiracy to commit the wrong." Statutes in a few states extend liability to a
state insurance commissioner, or by the companies themselves. In order to prevent the
adoption of arbitrary standards, it is preferable to have the standards set by the first
two methods.
41 Advisory Panel at 11.
42 Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2, at 541-42.
Self-insurance is to be distinguished from letting the loss fall on the injured party.
The existence of self-insurance implies that the property owner has devised a plan to meet
the contingency of financial loss. Letting the loss fall on the injured party is simply
risk retention; there is no assurance that the property owner has devised a scheme to
cushion the effect of a financial loss.
43 Id. at 542.
44 W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts §§ 7-12 (3d ed. 1964).
46 Id. §§ 46-27.
46 In DeVries v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764, 349 P.2d 532 (1960),
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rioter even where there is no evidence of a conspiracy. 47 Although this solu-
tion places the burden upon those involved in the disorder, it is not an effec-
tive remedy. In the states requiring an injured person to prove a conspiracy as
a predicate to liability, it would be a practical impossibility to gather the
evidentiary proof to satisfy this burden. In the states which allow recovery
against any participant regardless of the existence of a conspiracy, the injured
party must still prove that the damage was caused by a riot, as opposed to an
insurrection or rebellion." It is often difficult to prove that the loss was caused
by a riot because of the subtle distinctions which coujts" and legislatures°
the court states the common law rule that civil liability for injuries resulting from a
conspiracy of which the tortfeasor is a member will result even though the tortfeasor did
not join the conspiracy from its inception. It might be asked whether the holding in this
case can be extended to include people who join mass civil demonstrations.
47
 Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent a person whose property
has been destroyed or injured by a mob or riot from maintaining an action
against each and every person engaged or in any manner participating in the
mob or riot.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:48-5 (1952).
Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent the person or persons whose
property is injured or destroyed from having and maintaining his or their action
against all and every person engaged or participating in said riot or mob, to
recover full damages for any injury sustained: Provided, That no damages shall
be recovered by the party injured, against any of said rioters, for the same injury
for which compensation shall be made by the county.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 11823 (1956). Accord, S.C. Code'Ann. § 16-109 (1962).
These foregoing statutes also allow a municipality, which has paid damages resulting
from a riot, to recover against any person who participated in the riot regardless of
the existence of a conspiracy. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:48-7 (1952) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16,
§ 11824 (1956) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-111 (1962).
48
 A parallel problem exists today for a claimant under the Extended Coverage
Endorsement of the Standard Fire Policy in which losses occurring as a result of an
"insurrection" or "rebellion" are specifically excluded from coverage. See, e.g., N.Y. Ins.
Law § 168 (6) (McKinney 1966).
Insurrection is distinguished from rout, riot, and offenses connected with mob
violence by the fact that in insurrection there is an organized and armed
uprising against authority or operations of government, while crimes growing
out of mob violence, however serious they may be and however numerous the
participants, are simply unlawful acts in disturbance of the peace which do not
threaten the stability of the government or the existence of political society.
46 C.J.S. Insurrection and Sedition § 1 (1946). See Home Ins. Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d
731, 736 (1st Cir. 1954). But see In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (N.D. Ill.
1894), where insurrection is defined as ". . the open and active opposition of a number
of persons to the execution of law in a city or state."
For excellent and exhaustive articles on this subject see: Comment, Insurance Protec-
tion Against Civil Demonstrations, supra note 2; Johnson, The Insurer and Civil Disorders,
35 Ins. Counsel J. 408 (1968) ; Note, Riot Insurance, supra note 2.
49 E.g,, A riot has been defined as
A tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three persons or more assembling of
their own authority with an intent mutually to assist one another against
anyone who shall oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private
nature, and afterward actually executing the same in a violent and turbulent
manner to the terror of the people, whether the act intended were of itself lawful
or unlawful.
Symonds v. State, 66 Okla. Crim. 49, 54, 89 P.2d 970, 973 (1939). See also State v.
Abbadini, 38 Del. 322, 192 A. 550 (1937).
50 E.g., "Any use of force or violence, disturbing the public peace, or any threat to
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have made in defining riots. If the injured party is able to satisfy the sub-
stantive requirements of liability, it is doubtful, in most instances, whether
he would gain more than a pyrrhic victory, for the liable party will probably
be judgment proof. This solution also fails to provide the necessary spreading
of the loss, for the loss will be absorbed by either the injured party or the
rioter. Finally, it affords no protection to the owner whose property is de-
stroyed by non-riot means.
A third solution is municipal liability for damages caused by mob vi-
olence or riots. Such municipal liability has been imposed either by the com-
mon law51 or by statutes. 52 Municipal corporations, at common law, have
generally been considered immune from liability for the torts of their officers
and employees when the harm resulted from the exercise of the municipality's
governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions." Many courts have abro-
gated this immunity by judicial decision.54 Such judicial remedies have had
limited success because a number of states have enacted legislation which has
emasculated the decisions55 and because the injured party is usually required
to allege and prove the elements of a cause of action for negligence." Since
courts are usually loathe to set up standards of care for states and municipal-
use such force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by two or
more persons acting together, and without authority of Iaw, is a riot." Cal. Penal Code
§ 404 (West 1955).
51 E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist, No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959) ; Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d
265 (1958), Generally, see W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts § 125, at 1004-13
(3d ed. 1964).
52 At present there are fourteen states which have statutes providing for municipal
liability for loss due to riots. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-108 (1960) ; Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-201 (1964) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.100 (1963) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17,
§ 3354 (1965); Md. Ann. Code art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269,
§ 8 (1959) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 537.130-.160 (1953) ; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 11-1503
(1968) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:53 (1955) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:48-1 to -7 (1952) ;
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §§ 11821-26 (1956) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 45-15-13 (1956) ; S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-107 (1962) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66-091 (1961).
The New York municipal liability statute, N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 71 (McKinney
1965), has been suspended by the New York State Defense Emergency Act of 1951, N.Y.
Unconsol. Laws § 9193(3) (McKinney 1961). The Emergency Act was to remain in
effect until July 1, 1952, but it has been amended at various times so that its duration
will extend at least until July I, 1971. Ch. 115, 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 157
(McKinney 4968)). For an extended discussion of the troubled history of this statute,
see 50 Cornell L.Q. 699 (1965).
53 Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 15 N.Y. Conn. L. Rep. 674
(Sup. Ct. 1842). See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22
U. Chi. L. Rev. 610 (1955) ; Smith, Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 41
(1949).
54 E.g. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (prisoner in
town jail suffocated by inhalation of smoke caused by negligence of jailor) ; Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, II Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961) (hospital held
liable for negligence of its staff which injured patient).
55 E.g. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 814-95 (West 1966) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.996(107)
(Pocket Supp. 1968). See also Johnson, The Insurer and Civil Disorders, 35 Ins. Counsel
J. 408, 416 (1968).
5 ° See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 II 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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ities,57 the riot victim is afforded very little protection in the common law
jurisdictions.
On the other hand, most of the statutes providing for municipal liability
as a result of riot damage do not require the plaintiff to allege and prove negli-
gence.° However, the statutes vary in their scope. Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, allows an injured party who has had property damage exceeding 50 dollars
to recover against the municipality three-fourths of his total damage if he has
been diligent in seeking to avoid the harm.5° If the owner's negligence or im-
proper conduct contributes to the injury, he will be barred from recovery in
most states.° Connecticut, Kentucky and Maryland, unlike the other states,
and similar to the common law jurisdictions, have imposed liability only when
the claimant can establish negligence by the municipality in failing to sup-
press the violence."
Several administrative problems presently hinder the successful operation
of these statutes as risk-shifting devices. The statutes requiring the property
owner to prove negligence are not very helpful, for courts in these jurisdictions
will also be reluctant to establish standards of due care for municipal em-
ployees.62 The minimum and maximum recoveries do not allow a person in
many instances to recoup even a small portion of his damages. The notifica-
tion° and statute of limitations" provisions in some statutes are too brief.
In most states, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the harm was
caused by a riot as defined by the applicable state statute" or the relevant
case law."
In addition to problems posed in the determination and litigation of
claims, it is questionable, in light of competing needs for the limited municipal
financial resources, whether these statutes as presently constituted, will re-
main in force.° The impact of a widespread riot could seriously endanger the
57 See Raven v. Coates, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961) ; Fette v. City of St. Louis,
366 S.W.2d 446 (1963).
58 Kan. Stat. Ann. §12-202 (1964) (lack of negligence by municipality may be
shown in mitigation of damages) ; Mc. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 3354 (1965) ; Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 8 (1959) ; Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 537.130-.160 (1953) ; Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. § 11-1503 (1968) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:53 (1955); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 2A:48-1 to -7 (1952) ; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §§ 11821-26 (1956) ; R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 45-15-14 (1956) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-107 (1962) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 66.091
(1961). See E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.147 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
59 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 8 (1959).
60 E. McQuillin, supra note .58.
61 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-108 (1960) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.100 (1963) ;
Md. Ann. Code art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965).
62 See Raven v. Coates, 125 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961) ; Fette v. City of St. Louis,
366 S.W.2d 446 (1963).
63 E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-108 (1966) (notice of the damage to the property
must be filed within 30 days after the occurrence of the riot).
64 E.g. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:48-2 (1952) (3-month statute of limitations).
65 E.g. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 3355 (1965). Also, see notes 48, 49 & 50 supra.
08 E.g., City of Madisonville v. Bishop, 113 Ky. 106, 67 S.W. 269 (1902).
67 California, Illinois and Louisiana have repealed their municipal liability statutes.
Cal. Laws ch. 81, § 1 [1949] Cal. Stat. 259-60 (repealed 1963) ; Law of July 28, 1961,
§ 25-3 [19611 Ill. Laws 1983 (repealed 1967) ; La. Acts, No. 51 118551 La. Acts. 346
(repealed 1966).
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financial integrity of a city treasury." In order to satisfy municipal liability
judgments, cities would have to raise property taxes or local income taxes
each time they were faced with substantial claims." These surcharges would be
imposed on property owners within the urban core area, as well as without,
and might seriously affect the already tenuous position of property owners
within the core area.
Another problem with municipal liability statutes is that they fail to
provide the spreading of the risk which is essential to an effective insurance
system. The losses are paid primarily from tax revenues so that the financial
burden extends only as far as the city limits. Also, these statutes do not offer
the urban core property owner any incentive to improve his property, for it is
irrelevant to a claimant's right to recovery that his property was in substandard
condition prior to the loss.
The major asset of municipal liability lies in its potential deterrent effect
upon future disorders. Since local government has the primary responsibility
to maintain law and order, it is best situated to control the outbreak of dis-
order and to alleviate the underlying conditions fostering unrest within the
urban core. The citizens of a city faced with the impending cost of municipal
liability claims will hopefully be more vigilant in demanding the scrupulous
enforcement of laws. However, this deterrent effect is mitigated because
municipal fiscal problems often require cities to resort to state subsidization
in order to pay outstanding claims. The state taxpayers who are paying for
the subsidies through the imposition of higher state taxes are often the people
who can do very little to rectify the situation. Most of these taxpayers live
outside the municipality where the disorder has occurred so that they wield
little political power in the determination of municipal policies.
A fourth solution is to retain the present system of private insurance un-
derwriting as it exists in other areas. As indicated previously, this system has
proven inadequate to meet the special problems of insuring urban core prop-
erty." Property owners have had great difficulty in obtaining necessary
coverage and those who have been successful have paid exorbitant pre-
miurns.71
 Under this system, the incentive to improve property is lacking be-
cause of the insurance industry's notorious practice of refusing insurance on
the basis of the location of the property, and not on the particular character-
istics of the risk." The spreading of the risk is minimal because insurance com-
panies tend to shy away from urban core areas and because reinsurance is
unavailable.
As a result of the ineffectiveness of the normal insurance market, many
cities and states have developed yet another solution, "Urban Area Plans.""
68
 See Note, Riot Insurance, 77 Yale L.J. 541, 554 (1968) ; note 33 supra.
The precarious financial position of municipal treasuries is dramatically demonstrated
by the fact that one of the major cities of the United States, Philadelphia, is near bank-
ruptcy. The Boston Globe, Feb. 17, 1969, at 4, col. 1.
69
 It is also possible for cities to float bond issues in order to pay for its losses, but
many cities are legally forbidden to issue bonds without the consent of the electorate.
Voters usually reject such referenda.
79
 Advisory Panel at 1.
71
 Id. at 2.
72 H.R. Rep. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
3137-38.
73 According to the Advisory Panel, "Urban Area Plans" were in effect in thirteen
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The earliest plan was developed in Boston in 1960, 74 and has served as the
prototype for plans implemented in other states. Under the Boston plan, an
applicant unable to secure insurance coverage at normal rates applies to the
New England Insurance Rating Association and requests an inspection of his
property. Within two to five days after the request, the inspector, in the pres-
ence of the property owner or his representative,75 conducts a thorough in-
spection of the premises. The inspector then informs the property owner of
what repairs, if any, must be done prior to successful placement with an in-
surance company. After the owner has completed the recommended repairs,
he notifies the Rating Association, whereupon a reinspection of the property
is made. If the property is acceptable after the initial inspection or reinspec-
tion, the Rating Association submits a report to the insurance company
selected by the applicant. The insurance company has three available options.
It may underwrite the risk, decline the risk, or underwrite the risk upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions." The insurance company is then obligated
to inform the Rating Association of its decision. Each month, the Rating
Association files a report with the Massachusetts Insurance Department
stating the responses of each insurance company to the requests for property
insurance. The Boston plan has had mild success in obtaining insurance for
property owners in the urban core area."
The major attribute of Urban Area Plans is the requirement of an in-
spection of the property prior to a declination of the risk. Through the strict
supervision and moral suasion of an insurance commissioner, a company,
although not legally obligated to accept a risk even if it meets the current
standards of insurability, will be somewhat reluctant to reject a risk solely on
the basis of its location." Another asset of these plans is their provision for
conditional acceptance of a risk. This feature offers a property owner an in-
centive to improve his property.
The major drawback in these plans is their voluntary nature. As the
risk of loss in urban core areas increases because of rioting, it is natural that
companies will be less willing to participate in the plan. As companies with-
draw their coverage, fewer companies remain to absorb potential losses and
consequently there will not be sufficient dispersion of the risk. A second prob-
lem with these plans is that they offer very little deterrence to the outbreak
states as of Dec, 1, 1967: California, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
Advisory Panel at 56.
74 Id.
75 The presence of the property owner or his representative was considered essential
to insure that the inspector had the owner's "unqualified consent" to be on the property
(thus foreclosing any possible trespass action) and that the owner had notice of improve-
ments needed to remove fire hazards. Advisory Panel at 58.
76 The conditions usually take the form of the reparation of fire hazards or security
deficiencies or the installation of preventive devices such as sprinkler systems or burglar
alarms.
77 Advisory Panel at 59-61.
78 Because there is no statutory obligation to join the Urban Area Plans, the
insurance companies are legally free to decline participation in the plans. However, as
a practical matter, companies are loath to incur the wrath of the state insurance com-
missioner.
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of future violence. The losses incurred by the insurance companies will ulti-
mately fall upon the policyholders and stockholders, who are seldom the in-
stigators of the violence or those best situated to prevent future disorders.
VI. FEDERAL REINSURANCE PROGRAM
Although the Urban Area Plans have deficiencies, they have provided the
impetus for the enactment of federal and state statutory solutions." The
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 80 provides for a federal re-
insurance program in riot-affected areas, the Urban Property Protection and
Reinsurance Act of 1968.8 ' This program, recommended by the President's
National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas,82. provides
the groundwork for rebuilding in riot-stricken cities. One purpose of the
Act is to encourage and to assist state insurance departments and property in-
surance companies in the formulation and implementation of statewide pro-
grams capable of providing reasonable property insurance for all insurable
risks.83
 A second purpose is to provide federal reinsurance against extraordi-
nary losses resulting from riots and to place an appropriate share of the finan-
cial losses upon the states. 84
 The offering of federal reinsurance is contingent
upon the participation of an insurance company in a state program designed
to make property insurance more readily available in urban core areas."
The federal statute requires a state to form and organize an "all-industry
placement facility." 86
 The function of this facility is to place insurable risks
with property insurers within the state and to obtain from them insurance up
to the insurable value of the risks. 87
 The statute does not indicate whether a
pool of all property insurance companies within the state is necessary. It ap-
pears that states have an option between a pooling arrangement or a joint
association. The distinction between these two possible approaches is more one
of form than one of substance. A pooling arrangement consists of a combina-
tion of insurers, a pool, who share profits and losses in an amount equal to the
relative amount of property insurance business transacted within the state."
The pool is an entity separate from its members which underwrites the risks
itself. On the other hand, a joint association does not underwrite the risks; it
merely acts as a conduit between the property owner and its member insur-
ance companies. It places the insurance with the member insurers according
to an equitable formula, and the companies themselves underwrite the risks.
19 Statutes cited notes 3 & 4 supra.
89 Pub. L. No. 90-448 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2793.
81 This is the name of the specific titles applicable to insurance in the urban core
areas. Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XI and XII (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2894.
82 H.R. Rep. No. 1585, supra note 72, at 3137.
83
 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1102(b) (1) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2894.
84 Id. § 1102(b) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2894.
85 Id. § 1211(a), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2894.
86
 Id. § 1212, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
87. Id. § 1212(2), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
88
 For an exposition of the organization and operation of pooling arrangements set ,
Haugh, Insurance Pools, in Property and Liability Insurance Handbook 969 (Lang &
Gregg ed. 1965).
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The federal statute does not dictate what the exact wording of state
programs and statutes should be, but it lists several mandatory provisions
which must be included in the state plan if its participating insurers are to
qualify for federal reinsurance." Risks cannot be declined or written at sur-
charged rates unless an inspection of the property is made and the company
determines on the basis of the inspection that the risk does not meet reason-
able underwriting standards at the applicable premium rate." Requests for
inspections can be made by the insurer, agent, broker or property owner, and
can be made orally.° 1
 An inspection of a tenant's personal property and of the
building in which it is located can be conducted without the presence of the
building owner." A copy of the inspection report should be sent by the in-
spection facility to the insurer or to an "all-industry placement facility" as
may be chosen by the property owner." After determining whether the risk is
insurable, the insurer must promptly forward to the inspection facility an
action report, indicating acceptance, conditional acceptance or rejection of
the risk." If the insurer declines the risk or accepts it conditionally, it must
send a copy of the inspection and action reports to the property owner and to
the state insurance department." It must also inform the owner of his right
to appeal the insurer's decision to the insurance commissioner.ii°
If accepted, the policy must be written promptly after inspection and it
must be coded so that records can be kept of the operation of the state plan.97
The inspection facility must file periodic reports with the state insurance
department and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
stating the number of risks inspected, accepted, accepted conditionally and
declined by each insurance company." Notice must be given to a policyholder
a reasonable time prior to the cancellation or nonrenewal of insurance on any
risk eligible under the state plan to allow sufficient time for the owner's ap-
plication to be processed for coverage under the plan." The insurers, agents
and brokers are required to undertake a continuous education program to
80 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1211(6) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2898-99.
" Id. § 1211(b) (1), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898.
Cl Id. § 1211 (b) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898.
92 Id. § 1211(6) (3), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898. This provision is to be
contrasted with the Boston Urban Area Plan, see p. 661 & note 75 supra.
" Id. § 1211(6) (4), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898.
04 Id
. § 1211(b) (5), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898. The report must indicate the
amount of coverage that the company will write. If the company requires a surcharge, it
must specify what improvements must be made by the owner before the surcharge will
be removed. If the company accepts the risk conditionally, the improvements necessary
must be clearly specified. If the company declines the risk unconditionally, the reasons
must be given in the report. Id.
05 Id. § 1211 (b) (6), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
98 Id.
97 Id. § 1211(6) (7), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
98 Id. § 1211(b) (8), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
0 ° Id. § 1211(b) (9), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899. The company must also
inform the insured of the procedure to be followed in order to obtain an inspection under
the state plan. Id.
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assure that property owners are fully cognizant of their rights under the
plan ."°
The federal statute also solicits industry cooperation by requiring each
insurer desiring federal reinsurance to file a pledge of full participation in the
state plan.'" Any insurer participating in the reinsurance coverage must not
prohibit any agent or broker from soliciting business through the state
pialtioz
Once a state complies with the above rules, the property insurers partic-
ipating in the state program can then seek federal reinsurance against prop-
erty losses from civil disorders.'" The insurer must contract for reinsurance
with the Secretary of HUD."'" The details of the reinsurance plan are that
a participating insurer must pay HUD 1 IA percent of the premiums collected in
each state on basic property insurance. 105 If riot claims occur, a company
must pay toward the claims up to 2 percent of all the property insurance pre-
miums derived from the state, with HUD paying the remainder from its pool of
premiums collected from other participating companies.'" If these funds fail
to cover the loss, other property insurance companies within the state must
contribute up to their 2 percent limit.'" If this amount is still insufficient to pay
outstanding claims, the state where the riot occurred would have to contribute
up to 5 percent of the total premiums collected by all the property insurers
within the state.'" Any losses in excess of this amount would be financed by
funds borrowed by HUD from the United States Treasury.'" These loans
would be repaid by HUD from future reinsurance premiums."°
loo Id. § 1211(6)(10), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
101 Id. § 1213(a), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2900.
102 Id. § 1213(b), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2900.
103 Id.
 § 1221(a) (1), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2900. The Secretary of HUD,
upon petition from the state insurance department, has discretionary power to waive
compliance with any of the provisions. Id. § 1214(b), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad, News 2900.
104 Id. § 1222(a), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2901.
1 ° 5 Writing Insurance for Ghetto Property, Business Week, Oct. 26, 1968, at 68.
100 Id.
107 Id. at 70.
108 Id.
10° Id. This example will illustrate the mechanics of the reinsurance scheme. Assume
only states A and B have qualified for participation in the federal reinsurance plan.
State A has 3 participating insurance companies: X, Y, and Z. Companies X, Y, and Z
collect 100 million, 50 million and 20 million dollars respectively in premiums from
insurance applicants in State A. State B has 3 participating companies: Q, R and S.
Companies Q, R and S collect 40 million, 10 million and 10 million dollars respectively
from insurance applicants in State B. Reinsurance premiums from companies within
State A would total $2,125,000 (PA% X ($100 million + $50 million + $20 million)).
Reinsurance premiums from companies within State B would total $750,000 (1%% X
($40 million + $10 million + $10 million)). Total premiums in the reinsurance pool
held by HUD would total $2,875,000 ($2,125,000 + $750,000). If Company X in State
A has riot claims of 15 million dollars, Company X would itself pay $2,000,000 (2% X
$100 million). HUD would pay $2,875,000 from its pool. Company Y.
 in State A would
pay $1,000,000 (2% X $50 million) and Company Z in State A would pay $400,000
(2% X $20 million). State A would contribute $8,500,000 (5% X ($100 million + $50
million + $20 million)). HUD would be required to borrow $225,000 from the United
States Treasury to make up the deficit.
110
 H.12 Rep. No. 1585, supra note 72, at 3148.
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To the extent that the federal statute induces states to enact urban core
property insurance legislation and provides the necessary reinsurance for riot
losses, it should have a curative influence on the lack of insurance in urban
core areas. However, the insurance industry is not completely satisfied with
the statute,'" and their dissatisfaction might manifest itself in powerful lobby-
ing efforts to prevent the adoption of state plans. The companies complain
that the payment ceiling of 2 percent limits losses only within a particular state.
If a company has losses in many states, it may still have to absorb entire losses
without reaching the 2 percent limit in any one state.'" Accordingly, the com-
panies suggest that it would be wiser if the program had a limit on the losses
which a company would be required to absorb nationwide. 113 As currently
formulated, the statute favors companies which market insurance in a few
states. In general, companies feel that there is not enough revenue from the
urban core insurance business to pay for the 2 percent retention.'"
One of the major weaknesses of the federal statute is its failure to pro-
vide for municipal participation in the absorption of losses. The plan might
destroy incentives among city officials and residents in riot-affected areas to
limit the destruction caused by riots. Historically, the duty of maintaining
civil peace has rested on the cities. It can be argued that the cities should
have an obligation to pay riot losses commensurate with their responsibility
of law enforcement. An amendment to the federal statute was introduced
and rejected which would have provided for municipal participation in the
distribution of losses under the insurance plan. 115. The disadvantage in the
requirement that the municipality pay part of the losses is its imposition of
an additional monetary strain on city budgets.'" Nevertheless, where a city
lies within a state not having a municipal liability statute, this amendment
would have provided the necessary deterrence.
If a city is within a state having a municipal liability statute, the need
for "built-in" city participation in the federal plan is nonexistent. In fact,
municipal liability, because of its local administration, should have a greater
impact for the deterrence of future riots. Also, it is probably wiser to allow
the state and municipalities within the state to decide upon the specific allo-
cation of riot losses.117 This course will provide the local flexibility necessary
to meet the demands of a rapidly changing local situation.
Another weakness of the statute is its applicability only to losses occa-
111 Writing Insurance for Ghetto Property, supra note 105, at 70. At the outset the
payment ceiling was only 1%; it was subsequently raised to 2%. Id.
112 Id. at 70.
113 See Id.
114 Id.
115 114 Cong. Rec. 6460 (daily ed. May 27, 1968). The amendment was introduced
by Senator Richard Russell of Georgia and was defeated 35 to 25 with 40 not voting. In
brief, the amendment provided for the cities to contribute up to 5% of the premiums
earned on property insurance as a backup to the state contribution of 5%.
116 See p. 655 & note 38 supra.
117 The federal statute does not explicitly demand that the states apportion their
5% participation limit among the municipalities within its jurisdiction. However, it was
felt during the congressional debates that the states would voluntarily distribute any
losses among its constituent municipalities. 114 Cong. Rec., supra note 115, at 6462
(remarks of Senator Sparkman).
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sioned by riots. This restriction is replete with problems. Once again, the
problem of defining "riots" and "civil disorders" emerges.'" Also, the problem
of procuring adequate reinsurance existed prior to the widespread civil vi-
olencem and will undoubtedly endure after the threat of rioting diminishes.
A better system would reinsure all property within urban core areas, regard-
less of the cause of the loss.
Finally, the expense of maintaining the federal program might be very
high in relation to the amount of activity in which the program engages. Since
the amount of riot losses in any year can never be accurately estimated and
since the impact of any particular loss is potentially large, it will be necessary
to retain this federal reinsurance program until conditions have drastically
changed within urban core areas. And the conditions will probably not change
for many years. Eventually, this costly program could be phased out as
private insurance companies indicate a willingness to absorb more of the risk.
Aside from these weaknesses, the federal statute has several positive at-
tributes. The dispersion of risks provided in the statute by its reinsurance plan
should mitigate the effect of any extraordinary losses from riots or civil commo-
tion. Since the federal statute is not limited to urban core areas, it will allow a
company to reinsure against riot risks which may be located ouside the urban
core area. 12° The statute also creates a central locus where insurance in-
formation and statistics from all states can be accumulated and compared.
This pool of data will lead to the formulation and implementation of new
actuarial devices and loss prevention techniques.
The most attractive feature of the federal statute is its prescription of
the procedures which must be incorporated within a state plan prior to its
qualification for federal reinsurance. These procedural safeguards will provide
a strong foundation for construction of a fair and equitable state insurance
scheme. In addition to the procedures outlined in the federal statute, the
states should provide for the establishment of an inspection bureau indepen-
dent of its "all-industry placement facility." It is critical to an effective in-
surance scheme that an objective and thorough inspection of the property
be conducted, prior to the acceptance or rejection of any particular risk. Since
the facility, by its very nature, will want to minimize its losses, it might refuse
to insure property on the basis of factors extrinsic to the definition of insur-
ability. An independent inspection bureau will eliminate this possible abuse.
Also, it will adhere more closely to the underwriting standards and inspection
guidelines and will obviate the necessity of appealing unfavorable decisions
to the state insurance commissioner.
The state statutes should also provide for a mandatory inspection of the
property upon the applicant's proof that he has been denied coverage in the
normal insurance market by two or three companies. The objective of this
procedure is twofold. First, it will prevent a property owner from obtaining
an inspection until he has made a serious attempt to use the normal market.
This effort in turn will Tower the total costs of inspections. Second, the pro-
cedure apprises the property owner of exactly what steps must be taken in
158 See pp. 657-58 & notes 48-50 supra.
119 See p. 654 supra.
120 Pub. L. 90-448, § 1211(b) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2898.
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order to qualify for coverage under the state plan. Many of the state statutes
already enacted indicate that an applicant must make a "diligent effort" to
obtain insurance in the normal market."' It is submitted that the proposed
procedure will prevent the abuse which might result from such an undefined
standard.
VII. STATE STATUTORY PLANS
The federal statute has offered states an incentive to formulate remedial
legislation. Thus many state insurance statutes have recently been enacted.
In this section, eight of these statutes 122 will be examined with attention to
their similarities and differences, attributes and weaknesses.
All these statutes establish means through which property owners in
urban core areas should have access to property insurance without payment
of exorbitant rates. Aside from the many procedural distinctions, basic dif-
ferences of approach are taken to accomplish this objective. Some of these
statutes require the establishment of a pooling arrangement; 125 others require
the formation of a joint association with the function of aiding property
owners and tenants to acquire property insurance.' 24 The latter usually pro-
vide for the concomitant organization of a joint reinsurance association whose
function is to reinsure risks meeting certain prescribed standards. 125 All the
121 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10093, 1968
CaI. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)); District of Columbia Insurance
Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1205(a) (3) (B) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2909, 2911 (reasonable effort); Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, § 524(1),
1968 III. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)) ; Urban Area Insurance Place-
ment Facility, ch. 731, § 2(3), 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968))
(reasonable effort); P.A. 262, § 24.12925(2) (b), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich Stat.
Ann. Current Material 497, 501 (1968)); Ch. 129, § 8(b) (1), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J.
Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)) ; New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint
Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 653(.1)(a), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190,
192 (McKinney 1968)).
122 Statutes cited note 4 supra. Some states have obtained the benefits of the federal
statute by Fair Plans, mandatory on all insurers, which were promulgated by the in-
surance commissioner (e.g., Oregon), or by voluntary Fair Plans established by the
insurance companies (e.g., Ohio).
123 P.A. 262, § 24.12920, 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material
497, 499-500 (1968)) ; Ch. 129, §§ 3-4, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)) ;
New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch.
131, § 652, 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
The Michigan statute has a unique provision which stays the implementation of the
pooling arrangement if an acceptable voluntary plan of operation has been filed with the
Michigan Insurance Commissioner. If the Commissioner is dissatisfied with the proposal,
he is authorized to implement the pooling arrangement. P.A. 262, § 24.12950(1), 1968
Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 506-07 (1968)).
124 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10094, 1968
Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)); District of Columbia Insurance
Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2909, 2910; Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, § 525, 1968 Ill. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13,
14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)); Urban Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, § 2, 1968
Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588 (1968)); Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 201,
1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 594 (1968)).
125 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10095, 1968
Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1028 (West 1968)); District of Columbia Insurance
Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1206 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
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statutes, however, require property insurers within the state to participate in
the program as a condition of doing property insurance business within the
state. 126
A. Constitutionality
The mandatory nature of these statutes gives rise to the possibility that
an insurer might challenge the statute as violative of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The leading
case in this area is California Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney.' 27
 The
Insurance Association was an incorporated association authorized to write
automobile insurance for selected risks. The Association refused to comply with
a California statute'=s establishing an assigned risk plan for drivers unable to
obtain insurance through ordinary methods.'" The insurance commissioner sub-
sequently suspended the Insurance Association's license, whereupon the Asso-
ciation sought a writ of mandate annulling the suspension.'" The Association
challenged the suspension on the ground that the statute, by forcing insurers
to enter into high risk contracts and to incur liabilities against its will, was
taking the Association's property without due process of law. 131
 Specifically,
it argued that the statute required it to change its type of business from a
cooperative company with a select membership to a company insuring the
general pubIic.132
2909, 2911-13; Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, § 526, 1968 III. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv.
13, 14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)); Urban Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, § 4,
1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589-90 (1968)); Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act
233, § 203, 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 597 (1968)). In Pennsylvania, the joint
association or placement facility also offers reinsurance.
126 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, §§ 10094,
10095, 1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027-28 (West 1968)) ; District of Columbia
Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1204(c), 1206(b) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910, 2912. (The District of Columbia statute allows the
insurance commissioner to fine the insurance company up to $200 for failure to comply
with the mandate of the program in lieu of revoking the company's authority to transact
business if the commissioner deems it in the public interest); Pub. L. No. 90-488, § 1204(c)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910; Urban Property Insurance, Act
1840 §§ 525, 526(1), 1968 Ill. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)); Urban
Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, §§ 2(1), 4, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg.
Serv. 588, 588-90 (1968)); P.A. 262 § 24.12920(1), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat.
Ann. Current Material 497, 499 (1968)); Ch. 129, § 3, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv.
436, 437 (1968)) ; New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting
Association, ch. 131, § 652(1), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney
1968)) ; Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 201(2), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv.
592, 594 (1968)).
127 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
128 Cal. Stets., ch. 39, at 525, as amended, Cal. Ins. Code § 11620 (West Pocket Part
1968). The statute required the insurance commissioner to establish an assigned risk plan
and his plan included certain exclusions. For example, the insurers were not required to
insure persons convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol more than once during
the three
-year period prior to the application for insurance. 341 U.S. at 107 n.l.
120
 341 U.S. at 108.
ISO Id.
181 Id,
132 Id.
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The Supreme Court gave short shrift' to this argument and stated that
"the power of the state is broad enough to take over the whole business [of
insurance] leaving no part for private enterprise." 34
 The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute on the ground that the state has the power
in the public interest to require an insurance company to assume a propor-
tionate share of the burden of insuring these higher risks'35 and that the
dimunition in value of the company's business as a result of participation in
the plan did not amount to a "taking in the constitutional sense." 136 Because
a state can adopt whatever economic restrictions or regulations are reasonably
necessary to promote public welfare, a statute is constitutional if it has a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary
nor discriminatory. 137
Since 1940, the regulation of insurance companies has been considered
within the public interest and thus subject to state regulation. 138 The exist-
ence in Maloney of a proper legislative purpose was evidenced by the problem
which the statute was designed to alleviate. The California legislature had
determined that certain drivers of motor vehicles had to insure themselves or
show financial responsibility prior to registering their vehicles lest they be judg-
ment proof in possible tort actions.'" Many people were unable to obtain in-
surance or to show the requisite financial responsibility to register their
vehicles. Since the livelihood of many of these people depended upon their
ability to use the highways, the legislature enacted the statute in question,
which enabled this class to obtain insurance through the assigned risk pooL140
In demonstrating that the California statute was not arbitrary or dis-
criminatory, the Court emphasized that there were several limitations on the
obilgations of an insurer under the plan. The premiums charged by the com-
panies could be commensurate with the greater risk of the business." 41 The
risks under the plan had to be apportioned equitably among all automobile
133 Justice Black wished to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the constitutional
issue was frivolous. Id. at 111.
134 Id. at 110.
135
 Id. at 109.
1341 Id. at 111.
137 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
158 See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940). See also Caminetti v. State Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 321, 126 P.2d 165 (1942).
Since the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1011-15 (1964), in the absence of congressional legislation specifically concerning in-
surance, the states may enact legislation regulating insurance.
138 341 U.S. at 106. In general, the California law at the time of Maloney and at
present requires that a person who fails to pay a judgment of $100 or more, arising out
of an automobile accident, within 30 days after the judgment is rendered against him is
to have his license suspended until the judgment is satisfied and until the judgment debtor
can establish proof of his ability to pay claims arising from future accidents, See Cal.
Vehicle Code §§ 16250-372 (West 1960).
148 For a history of the events preceding enactment of the California assigned risk
statute, see California Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Downey, 96 Cal. App. 2d 876,
216 P.2d 882 (1950), aff'd sub nom. California Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v.
Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
141 341 U.S. at 108.
669
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
insurers in California. 142
 Uninsurable risks were eliminated; "3 policies issued
could have 5000 to 10,000 dollar ceilings. 144
The rationale of the Maloney case can be extended to mandatory as-
signed risk property insurance plans established by the eight statutes in
' question. Since these statutes purport only to regulate the insurance in-
dustry and do not allow the states to take over the industry, they are sub-
ject to the requirement that they be reasonably related to a proper legislative
purpose. The statutes are also subject to the due process requirement that
they not be arbitrary or discriminatory.
The Advisory Panel has provided extended documentation of the serious
lack of fire and extended coverage insurance in urban core areas which existed
prior to the enactment of these statutes. 145 An adequate market for property
insurance is necessary to attract private capital to the urban core area. Orderly
community development depends upon the accessibility of property insurance
at reasonable rates so that owners will be able to finance capital expenditures.
Voluntary efforts to solve the problem have been helpful, but have not been
sufficient to meet the needs of the situation. Thus, it is in the public interest
for states to require insurance companies to underwrite the risks located in
urban core areas.
With respect to the due process requirements, these statutes must be
closely examined in light of the Maloney limitations necessary to avoid char-
acterization as unconstitutionally confiscatory, arbitrary or discriminatory.
All the statutes provide for an equitable apportionment of the risks among
all property insurers within the state. 14° All of the statutes provide a formula
for calculation of the extent of each company's required participation in the
pool or placement facility. 147 New Jersey, for example, requires members of
142
 Id. at 108-09.
143 Id. at 109.
144 Id .
145 Advisory Panel, apps. A & B.
146
 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, §§ 10090(d),
10094, 1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)) ; District of Columbia
Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1202(4), 1204 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910; Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, §§ 522, 523(3),
525, 1968 III. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)); Urban Area Insurance
Placement Facility, ch. 731, § 2(2), 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)) ;
P.A. 262, § 24.12920(2), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497,
499 (1968)); Ch. 129, § 6, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 438 (1968)) (does not
explicitly use the words "equitable apportionment," but states a participation formula
which is in fact equitable) ; New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint
Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 654, 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 192-3
(McKinney 1968)) (does not explicitly use the words "equitable apportionment," but
states an equitable participation formula) ; Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233,
§§ 102(6), 201(b) (2), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 593, 594 (1968)).
147
 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10095(c),
1968 Cal. Laws (Cal, Leg. Serv. 1026, 1028 (West 1968)) ; District of Columbia Insur-
ance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1206(d) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2909, 2912; Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, § 526(3), 1968 Ill. Acts
(Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14-15 (Smith-Hurd 1968)) ; Urban Area Insurance Placement Fa-
cility, ch. 731, § 4, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589-90 (1968)) ; P.A. 262,
§§ 24.12926, 24.12927, 24.12928, 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Ma-
terial 497, 502-03 (1968)); Ch. 129, § 6, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 438
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the pool to participate in the profits and losses in the proportion that the net
direct premiums of the insurer written in the state during the preceding calen-
dar year bear to the aggregate net direct premiums written by all members
of the pool.'" Since all the statutes attempt to distribute the risks in a fair
and equitable manner, it cannot be argued that a statute discriminates against
particular companies.
A further constitutional safeguard is provided by the requirement that
the property meet certain reasonable underwriting standards; 1" however, the
standards for determining insurability are not enumerated in most of the
statutes.15° They are usually left to the directors of the pool or placement facility
who are expected to include them within their plan of operation.15 ' The in-
surance commissioner in each state is given broad power to review the standards
set by the directors and can effectually dictate the underwriting standards to
be utilized within the state*" Thus, a question does arise whether these stat-
(1968)); New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Associa-
tion, ch. 131, § 654(1), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 192-93 (McKinney 1968));
Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 201(1), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 595
(1968)).
149 Ch. 129, § 6, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 438 (1968)).
149 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10094, 1968
Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027-28 (West 1968)); District of Columbia Insurance
Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1204(a), 1206(c)(1)(F) (Aug. 1, '1968), U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910, 2912; Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, § 525,
1968 Ill. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)); Urban Area Insurance Place-
ment Facility, ch. 731, § 4, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)); P.A.
262, § 24.12924(2), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 501
(1968)) (suitable standards); Ch. 129, §§ 2(e), 7(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv.
436, 437, 438 (1968)) (insurable condition) ; New York Fire and Extended Coverage
Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 652(3)(a), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y.
Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)) ; Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 201(c),
1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 594 (1968)).
130 The Michigan statute does not list all the standards, but does Iist more stand-
ards than any of the other statutes under examination. P.A. 262, § 24.12901(c), 1968
Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 497-98 (1968)).
151 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, §§ 10094,
10095(a), 1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027-28 (West 1968)) ; District of
Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1205(a), 1206(c) (1) (Aug.
1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2911, 2912; Urban Property Insurance, Act
1840, §§ 525, 526, 1968 III. Acts (I1I. Leg. Sent. 13, 14-15 (Smith-Hurd 1968)) ; Urban
Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, §§ 2(3), 4, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg.
Serv. 588, 589 (1968)) ; P.A. 262, § 24.12924, 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann.
Current Material 497, 501 (1968)); Ch. 129, § 7(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv.
436, 438 (1968)); New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting
Association, ch. 131, § 652(3)(a), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (Mc-
Kinney 1968)) ; Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 201(c), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa.
Leg. Serv. 592, 594 (1968)).
152 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10095(e),
1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1028 (West 1968)) ; District of Columbia Insur-
ance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1205(b), 1206(c) (2), (3) (Aug. 1, 1968),
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910, 2912; Urban Property Insurance Act, Act
1840, §§ 525, 530, 1968 Ill. Acts (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 14, 15 (Smith-Hurd 1968)) ; Urban
Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, §§ 4, 5, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv.
588, 589-90 (1968)) ; P.A. 262, §§ 24.12920(2), (4), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat.
Ann. Current Material 497, 499-500 (1968)); Ch. 129, §§ 7(b), (c), (d), 1968 N.J. Laws
(N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 438-39 (1968)); New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insur-
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utes contain the necessary restrictions, for an insurance commissioner could,
acting within the scope of the statute's mandate, set whatever standards he
deemed feasible. It can be argued, however, that the insurance commissioner
must adhere to reasonable standards of insurability. If the insurance commis-
sioner's plan of operation appeared arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, an
affected insurer would then acquire a sound constitutional basis for challenging
the statute.
Although all the statutes include provisions for equitable distribution of
risks and for the adoption of reasonable underwriting standards, some are
even more specific in their exclusion of particular risks. Michigan, for ex-
ample, disqualifies property which fails to comply with state and local build-
ing codes to the extent that conditions on the property are reasonably related
to the perils insured against.I 53
 California specifically excludes commercial
risks from the scope of its insurance plan. 154 The District of Columbia statute
allows insurers to employ deductibles, percentage participation clauses and
other underwriting devices to meet special problems of insurability. 165 Penn-
sylvania allows insurers to assess surcharges for hazardous conditions exist-
ing on the property.156
 It would appear that the foregoing limitations, al-
though not essential to assure the constitutionality of these statutes, provide
strong rebuttal to an argument that these statutes arbitrarily force insurers
to insure all risks regardless of the condition of the property. In sum, all the
statutes would be constitutionally valid under the rule in the Maloney case.
As an added precaution, a state contemplating the enactment of an assigned
risk property insurance plan should consider the integration into its plan
of some of the specific limitations mentioned above.
B. Effectiveness of State Plans
Aside from possible constitutional defects, each of these statutes must be
examined for its effectiveness in (1) spreading the risk of loss, (2) deterring
future civil disturbances, (3) offering incentives to improve property and (4)
inducing companies to make capital investments within the urban core area.'"
Each of the statutes will also be evaluated in terms of some of the essential
procedural safeguards outlined in the federal statute. 158
ante Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, §§ 652(3)(b), (c), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y.
Leg. Serv. 190, 191-92 (McKinney 1968)); Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233,
§§ 201(c), (d), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 594-95 (1968)).
153
 P.A. 262, § 24.12901(c) (ii), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current
Material 497, 498 (1968) ).
154 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, § 10091 (c),
1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)). Although this exclusion would
seem to help the constitutionality of the legislation, it is submitted that commercial risks
should be included with the scope of the statute for other important reasons. See pp. 678-
79 infra.
155 District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204(a)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910,
156 Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act, Act 233, § 202(4), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv.
592, 596 (1968). For an extensive listing of the property upon which a surcharge may be
assessed, see The Sunday Bulletin, Philadelphia, Oct. 27, 1968, Fire Insurance Extended
in Ghetto Areas, at 1, col. 3.
157
 See pp. 654-56 supra, for the necessary ingredients of a property insurance plan.
158 See pp. 663-64 supra.
672
INSURANCE IN URBAN CORE AREAS
Although all the statutes have essentially the same purpose, they can be
divided, for purposes of analysis, into three distinct categories. The first type
examined is the pooling arrangement which directly underwrites risks within
urban core areas. The second type establishes a placement facility or joint
association to assist property owners in acquiring insurance. The third type
is exemplified by the Michigan scheme which allows insurance companies to
insure voluntarily risks within the urban core area.
1. Pooling Arrangements.---The New Jersey and New York statutes au-
thorize the establishment of a pooling association.tSS It has the express power to
grant insurance coverage to qualified applicants, to reinsure qualified property
insured by members of the association, and to cede reinsurance."° In addition,
it is required to submit a plan of operation to the insurance commis-
sioner."' After the pooling association's plan of operation has been approved
by the commissioner, a person who has an insurable interest in property and who
is unable to obtain property insurance coverage through the normal market is
entitled to apply to the association for coverage and for an inspection of the
property.162 In New Jersey, the applicant's property must be situated within the
urban core area, 163 whereas in New York the property can be located anywhere
within the state. 164 If the applicant, in either state, is able to show that he
has been unable to obtain property insurance in the normal market, that his
property is insurable, and that there is no unpaid, uncontested premium. out-
standing on the property, the association is required to issue a policy for a
one-year period.165 Any unfavorable decision can be appealed as a matter of
right to the state insurance commissioner. 166
159 Ch. 129, §§ 3, 4, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, §§ 652(1),
(2), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
160 Ch. 129, § 4, 1968 N.J. Laws (NJ. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 652(2)
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
161 Ch. 129, § 7(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 438 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 652(3)-
(a), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv, 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
162 Ch. 129, § 8(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, §§ 653(1)-
(a), 651(5), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 192 (McKinney 1968)). (In New
York, inspection of the property precedes the application for insurance to the pooling
association.)
163 Ch. 129, § 2(c), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)). "Urban
area" means any city or part thereof ". . . (1) which the Secretary of . [HUD] has
approved as eligible for an urban renewal project after a local public agency has been
formed in that community to avail itself of a United States Housing and Urban Renewal
Program or (2) designated by the [pooling] association with the approval of the com-
missioner or (3) which the commissioner may designate." Id. § 2(h) (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436,
437 (1968)).
164 New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Associa-
tion, ch. 131, § 651(5), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190 (McKinney 1968)).
165 Ch. 129, § 8(b), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, §§ 653(1)-
(a), (b), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 192 (McKinney 1968)).
166 Ch. 129, § 8(c), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)) ; New York
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There are several administrative weaknesses inherent in the pooling ar-
rangements established in New Jersey and New York. Although the statutes
provide for an inspection of the property at the request of the applicant,' 67
they fail to state explicitly how or by whom the inspection will be conducted.
It appears, however, that the association itself will be conducting inspections.
A preferable alternative is to establish a special administrative agency (per-
haps an adjunct of the state insurance commissioner's office) to conduct in-
spections and to forward reports to the association. 108
A second weakness of both statutes is their failure to elucidate the pro-
cedure which the association must follow after the inspection report has been
received. Neither statute incorporates a procedure for notifying the applicant
of the action which the pool intends to take with respect to the risk. Thus, an
applicant could conceivably wait months before he were informed of the
status of his application. The statutes do not indicate what period of time
must elapse before an uninformed applicant may appeal to the commissioner.
In New Jersey the plan of operation is required to specify the time interval,"°
whereas the New York statute fails completely to mention the proper pro-
cedure which an applicant may follow if no action has been taken by the
pooI."° These omissions will undoubtedly lead to frustration and confusion
and it is critical that they be corrected by a requirement that the pool notify
the applicant of its decision within a short period of time after the inspection.
A third weakness is that the statutes do not require the pools to provide
explanation for rejections. Thus, an applicant might receive a rejection with-
out even a hint of the cause. An applicant, in order to discover the reasons
for the rejection of his property would have to resort to the time-consuming
process of an appeal to the insurance commissioner. The statutes should be
amended to provide the applicant with a detailed report of the reasons which
prompted the pool to reject the risk. The applicant will then be advised
immediately of what conditions on the property demand rectification and he
will be able to alleviate the condition and to reapply for coverage. The report
would also provide the incidental advantage of protecting an applicant against
rejection on the basis of the location of his risk.
A fourth weakness is that the statutes do not offer the rejected applicant
an immediate right to bring suit in a court of law. If the pool refuses to under-
write the risk, the applicant must appeal to the insurance commissioner for
reversal."' If the commissioner orders the pool to accept the risk and the
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 655(1),
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 193 (McKinney 1968)).
167 Ch. 129, § 8(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)); New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 651(5),
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 190-91 (McKinney 1968)).
ies See p. 666 supra. Also, see the Michigan statute providing for an independent
inspection bureau. P.A. 262, §§ 24.12910, 24.12901(b), 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich.
Stat. Ann, Current Material 497, 498 (1968)). Also see Advisory Panel at 92-94.
166 Ch. 129, § 8(c), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 439 (1968)).
170 Only where the plan of operation adopted pursuant to the statute defines non-
action as an "appealable" matter will the applicant be entitled to an appeal to the com-
missioner. Ch. 131, § 655(1), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv, 190, 193 (McKinney
1968)).
171 Ch. 129, § 8(c), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 440 (1968)); New York
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pool still refuses, the applicant or insurance commissioner may then institute
legal proceedings to compel the pool to accept the risk. 72 This procedure con-
stitutes an administrative quagmire. A preferable approach would allow a re-
jected applicant standing to sue without a preliminary appeal to the insurance
commissioner.
Still another statutory deficiency is the absence of provision for accept-
ances conditioned upon the alleviation or rectification of a hazard existing
on the property. One of the purposes of the statutes should be to offer in-
centives to the property owner to make necessary improvements on the
property. Without conditional acceptances, the owner will probably receive
an absolute rejection with no information as to what repairs are necessary.
Under such circumstances, an owner is unlikely to invest money in repair or
improvement. Although the New Jersey and New York statutes do not ex-
plicitly provide for these safeguards, it is possible that they could be in-
corporated into the plan of operation of their respective pooling associations.
A third general weakness of these statutes is their failure to define "in-
surability." Both statutes allow the pooling association to set up reasonable
standards of insurability. 173 However, the two statutes specifically prohibit
underwriting decisions to be made on the basis of the neighborhood or loca-
tion of the risk.' 74 Since the success of these plans hinges upon the adoption
of reasonable standards of insurability, the standards should be outlined
within the statutes themselves.
One of the major assets of these statutes is their provision for extensive
recordkeeping. The association must file an annual statement with the insur-
ance commissioner. It should contain detailed information regarding its trans-
actions, financial condition, operations and affairs during the year. 175 The in-
surance commissioner is also authorized to obtain other information which he
deems relevant to an evaluation of the plan.'" The commissioner in New Jersey
is required to submit an annual report to the state legislature advising them of
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 655(1),
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 193 (McKinney 1963)) (rejection appealable only
if the plan of operation so designates).
172 The statutes explicitly provide for judicial review from orders of the commis-
sioner. Ch. 129, § 12, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 440 (1968)) ; New York Fire
and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 655(2),
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 193 (McKinney 1968)). However, in light of the
overall purpose of the statutes, it would appear that the commissioner or the applicant
would be able to institute legal proceedings to enforce the orders of the Commissioner.
17 :3 Ch. 129, §§ 2(e), 7(a), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437, 438 (1968)) ;
New York Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch.
131, §§ 651(5), 652(3)(a), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
174 Ch. 129, § 2(e), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 651(5).
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Seri, 190, 191 (McKinney 1968)).
175 Ch. 129, § 15, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 440 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 657.
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 193 (McKinney 1968)).
176
 Ch. 129, § 15, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 440 (1968)) ; New York
Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance Joint Underwriting Association, ch. 131, § 657,
1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 193 (McKinney 1968)).
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the status of the insurance plan.'" This procedure is necessary to assure
that rating of the property accurately reflects the incidence of loss within the
urban core area. With this widespread dissemination of information, the
probability increases that the underwriting decision will be made on the basis
of thorough investigation and consideration of the risk. It will also help the
insurers in the development of loss prevention techniques and underwriting
devices. A further use of the information might be to inform the building
code enforcement office of violations of city ordinances.
The most distinctive feature of the New York plan is its applicability to
all insurable property within the state.'" If civil strife should spread beyond
the bounds of the urban core area, insurers would probably be as unwilling
to underwrite outside the area as within it. The New York legislature has
demonstrated farsighted anticipation of such a contingency. The added cost of
the expanded coverage should be minimal, since, absent the actual expansion
of violence, property owners outside the urban core area should be able to
obtain their insurance through the normal market.
Another feature of the New York statute consonant with the plan's wide
coverage is its applicability to manufacturing risks, as well as other com-
mercial and private risks. 1 i9 This applicability should offer encouragement
to industrial companies considering the construction of manufacturing plants
within the urban core area.
On the other hand, the New Jersey statute excludes from coverage all
manufacturing risks within the urban core area18° as well as all risks outside
the area."' Although the federal reinsurance statute allows a state to exclude
certain manufacturing risks,'" a comprehensive statute should include manu-
facturing risks to promote the development and expansion of industry within
the urban core area.
Aside from administrative virtues and deficiencies, it is important to
examine the potential effectiveness of these plans. Because of the recency of
these plans and the general method of operation outlined in the statutes, it is
difficult to make a meaningful assessment. However, the New Jersey plan has
several built-in devices which should provide a sound basis of spreading risks.
It establishes a New Jersey Insurance Development Fund to supply a finan-
cial backup to the funds accumulated by the pooling association.'" The
Fund will be financed primarily from a surcharge on all property insured
177 Ch. 129, § 17, 1968 N.J. Laws (NJ. Leg. Serv. 436, 440 (1968)).
178 Ch. 131, § 651(5), 1968 N.Y. Laws (N.Y. Leg. Serv. 190, 190-91 (McKinney
1968)).
178 Id. (by implication).
180 Ch. 129, § 2(e), 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 437 (1968)).
181 Id.
182 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1203(2) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2896.
183 Ch. 129, §§ 18-23, 1968 N.J. Laws (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 440-42 (1968)). In
brief, the insurance commissioner will determine the amount of losses which the associa-
tion will retain. The Fund will reimburse the association for amounts in excess of this
predetermined figure up to a maximum of 5% of the insurance premiums written on
essential property insurance within the state. If the Fund is insufficient to pay all claims,
the residue will be paid by an interest-free loan from the State Treasury.
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within the state.'" The surcharge will be assessed on all insured property
owners, and insurance companies are strictly forbidden to absorb the sur-
charge. 188
 Thus the burden of excessive losses is spread primarily among all
insured property owners within the state. If the losses incurred in any par-
ticular year do not necessitate the use of money from the Fund, the surcharge
will be abated for the next year. 188 If the losses exhaust the pool as well as the
Fund, the surcharge will be assessed again in the following year to bring the
Fund up to its statutory limit) 87
The success of this spreading technique depends to a great extent on the
future riot experience of the urban core areas within New Jersey. As long as
the situation does not worsen, it appears that this technique will be sufficient
to absorb the losses without prohibitive increase of the insurance rates. On
the other hand, if the incidence of riots increases, this system might lead to
the regular imposition of high surcharges. Also, it is doubtful whether Con-
gress, in providing for mandatory state participation in the distribution of
losses within the federal reinsurance statute, would have considered the New
Jersey Insurance Development Fund an acceptable state financial backup.
The state itself is not really participating in the distribution of losses. It has
shifted its responsibility to the insured property owners within the state.
This arrangement will not provide the type of spreading which would have
been available if the state had chosen to utilize its general tax revenues for the
financial backup.
The New York statute has not provided for a financial backup to its
pooling association. It is imperative that New York adopt such a backup if
it is to qualify for federal reinsurance. 188 Once New York does establish a
state financial backup to its pooling association and qualifies for federal
reinsurance, the spreading of the risk of loss should be sufficient.
It is doubtful that the New Jersey and New York plans, by themselves,
will be effective deterrent measures. The burden will ultimately fall upon
the stockholders and policyholders of the insurance companies, and it is
questionable whether these people are positioned to prevent or to curtail
future riots within the urban core area. Stockholders are often residents of
several states, and there is very little which an out-of-state resident can do
to alleviate the riot conditions. Policyholders are in a somewhat better posi-
tion to deter riots, but since they are located throughout the state, the only
effective deterrent action could operate at the state level. Since the focus of
law enforcement and the implementation of poverty reforms are primarily at
the local level, deterrent measures must be applied at this level.
Since New Jersey has a municipal liability statute, 189
 the deterrent
184
 Id. §§ 18-19 (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 44-0-41 (1968)). The amount of the sur-
charge will be determined annually by the insurance commissioner, but its aggregate
amount shall not exceed 5% of the premiums written on essential property insurance
during any year within New Jersey. Id. § 20 (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 441 (1968)).
183
 Id. § 20 (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 441 (1968)).
189 Id. § 21 (N.J. Leg. Serv. 436, 441 (1968)).
187 Id.
188
 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1223(a) (1) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong & Ad. News
2902.
189 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4&-1 (1952).
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effect lacking in the property insurance statute will probably be supplied by
the municipal liability statute. Currently, consideration is being given to
future amendment or abolition of this statute.'" It is felt that, if the New
Jersey and federal reinsurance statutes work effectively, the liability act will
no longer serve a useful purpose.'" It has been recommended that the statute
be amended by: (1) limiting the recovery of a claimant to 10,000 dollars, (2)
eliminating the right of insured property owners to have redress against the
municipality for losses due to mobs and riots and (3) eliminating the right
of an insurance company, as a subrogee, to have redress against the munici-
pality for such losses.192 Such an amendment will eliminate the healthy de-
terrent effect which a properly administered municipal liability statute can
provide and will destroy the incentive of some property owners to bring their
property up to standards of insurability. If a property owner realizes that
acquiring insurance will deny him the right of recovery, he might opt for
complete reliance upon the municipal liability statute. Although some amend-
ments to the statute are sorely needed, such as a maximum liability limit,
the proposed amendment will completely destroy its effectiveness.
New York, on the other hand, does not currently have a municipal liabil-
ity statute.'" Thus, the impact of the riots will not be felt by those people
who would be stimulated to resist lawlessness—the taxpayers of the munici-
pality—and there will be no deterrent effect.
2. Placement Facilities.—The statutes which utilize placement facilities
to apportion insurance risks have been divided, on the basis of similarities,
into three groups. California is treated separately because of its uniqueness.
a. The California Statute. California's statute is somewhat different
from the New Jersey and New York statutes because it calls for the estab-
lishment of an industry placement facility which will assist property owners
in securing property insurance.'" The facility, unlike the associations in
New Jersey and New York, has the option of distributing the risks by means
of assignment to its members or by a pooling arrangement.'" The statute
also establishes a joint reinsurance association consisting of all insurers li-
censed to write basic property insurance in California.'" The reinsurance
association is authorized to assume reinsurance of risks written by insurers
in conformity with the program established by the facility. 1"
The most glaring fault of the California statute is its restriction to resi-
dential property within the state 198 Commercial property is not within the
scope of this statute, and it will be necessary for the owners of such property
loo Letter from the Division of Legislation Information and Research of the State
of New Jersey to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev., October . 14, 1968.
1 921 dd
103 See note 52 supra.
194 Basic Property Insurance Inspection and Placement Plan, ch. 574, §§ 10091(e),
10094, 1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027-28 (West (1968)).
195 Id. § 10100.1 (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1029 (West (1968)).
196 Id. §§ .10091(a), 10095 (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1026-27, 1028 (West 1968)).
107 Id. § 10095(b) (Ca.I. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1028 (West 1968)).
198 Id. § 10091(c) (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)).
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to seek insurance within the normal market unless an urban area plan is
utilized to supplement the statute. Since the targets of rioters are usually
commercial enterprises, the statute affords very little relief to the primary
victims of the civil disturbances. Because of the statute's exclusion of all com-
mercial risks, there is serious question whether California will qualify for
federal reinsurance:19° If this were the result, the statute, by itself, would
not provide sufficient spreading of residential risks. Also, the statute offers
no inducement to industries or retailers contemplating investments within the
urban core area.
The California statute provides that any person having an insurable risk
in residential property shall be able to apply for an inspection of the property
by an independent inspection bureau20° if he has made a "diligent effort"
to secure insurance through the normal market. 201 The statute does not de-
fine "diligent effort," and it is important that this omission be cured in the
facility's plan of operation 202 A property owner should be well advised of
exactly what criteria will be used in the acceptance of risks.
This statute, like the two previous statutes, leaves most of the administra-
tive details for determining insurability to the facility. 203 Although this ar-
rangement gives the plan flexibility, some general guidelines should be stated
explicitly in the statute itself. For example, a prohibition against underwriting
insurance on the basis of environmental conditions, as appears in the New
Jersey and New York statutes, is so critical to the success of a property in-
surance statute that it should appear in the statute itself.
California does not have a municipal liability statute, and consequently
the deterrent effect of the statute is minimal. The burden of loss will fall
primarily upon the residential policyholders and the stockholders of the
property insurance companies. The California statute is weak also with regard
to the provision of notice to an applicant of unfavorable underwriting deci-
sions. There is no provision for conditional acceptances, and thus the statute
offers no incentive to improve the condition of one's property. There is also
no provision requiring the insurer to give reasonable notice of cancellation or
nonrenewal.2°4 These defects will disappear with the inclusion of such proce-
dural safeguards within the plan of operation. On the whole, however, this
statute is too general in nature and leaves too much to the discretion of the
members of the facility, reinsurance association and insurance commissioner.
b. Massachusetts and District of Columbia Statutes. Massachusetts and
the District of Columbia have enacted statutes which will enable insurers to
qualify for federal reinsurance. Each statute creates a placement facility to
199 Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1203(a) (2), 1211(b) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2896, 2898.
200 Ch. 574, § 10091(d), 1968 Cal. Laws (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)).
201 Id. § 10093(a) (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027 (West 1968)).
202 Id
. § 10094 (Cal. Leg. Serv. 1026, 1027-28 (West 1968)) (empowering the
facility to establish a plan of operation).
203 Id.
204
 This is one of the mandatory provisions listed in the federal statute. Pub. L.
No. 90-448, § 1211(b) (9) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2899.
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help property owners within urban core areas obtain insurance. 205 Upon proof
that the applicant is unable to obtain insurance through the normal market,
representatives of the facility will conduct an inspection of the property. 200
After the inspection, the facility will attempt to place the property with its
member , insurers. 2°7 In Massachusetts the insurers are obliged to inform the
facility of their decision 208
 Then the facility sends to the applicant a report
informing him of which companies have agreed to accept the risk or whether
acceptance is conditioned upon the completion of improvements to the
property. 2°°
The administrative provisions in the statutes are basically sound. The
applicant is promptly told why his property cannot be insured or what re-
pairs must be made if he still desires coverage. Another excellent provision
is the Massachusetts requirement that...inspection reports be sent to the build-
ing code department within the cities.m This practice will bring any salient
violations of city ordinances to the attention of the department and it will
allow the department to notify the owners of the violations before casualty
occurs.
The major shortcoming of the Massachusetts statute is its failure to
provide for the submission by the facility of periodic statistical reports to the
insurance commissoner. Another is that inspections are conducted by repre-
sentatives of the facility, rather than by an independent inspection bureau.
One of the main virtues of the Massachusetts statute is its provision for
a pooling arrangement if, in the opinion of the insurance commissioner, the
facility is not adequately filling the need?" The pool, which is referred to
as the "association," will be used for three purposes: (1) to insure risks from
applicants unable to obtain coverage through the facility's efforts, (2) to
assume reinsurance from members of the facility and (3) to cede reinsur-
ance.212 It is hoped that the facility will be able to cope with the insurance
needs, but the association might very well be needed if conditions worsen in
the urban core areas.
Similarly, if the placement facility in the District of Columbia does not
adequately fill the need, the insurance commissioner can establish an under-
writing association which shall be authorized to assume and cede reinsur-
2 ° 5 District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204(a)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910; Urban Area Insurance Placement
Facility, ch. 731, § 2, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588 (1968)).
200 District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1205(a)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2911; Urban Area Insurance Place-
ment Facility, ch. 731, § 2(3) (a), 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)).
2 ° 7 District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204(a)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910 (if requested by applicant) ;
Urban Area Insurance Placement Facility, ch. 731, § 2(3)(b), 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass.
Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)).
200 Ch. 731, § 2(3) (c), 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)) (by
implication).
2°° Id. §§ 2(3) (b), (c) (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)).
210 Id. § 2(3) (C) (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)).
211 Id
. § 4 (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589 (1968)).
212 Id. § 4 (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588, 589-90 (1968)).
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ance.213 Unlike Massachusetts, the District of Columbia association will not
be authorized to underwrite risks directly from the property owners 214
Since Massachusetts and District of Columbia insurers will be able to
obtain federal reinsurance, the spreading of risks should be adequate. The
lack of any deterrent measures in the Massachusetts statute is somewhat
ameliorated by the existence of a municipal liability statute in the state 2 16
One question which has never been answered by the Massachusetts courts
is whether the insurers are subrogated to the property owner's cause of
action against the city. If that is not the case, the deterrent effect of the
municipal liability statute will be minimal. The District of Columbia lacks
a municipal liability statute and consequently has no effective deterrent
measures. Since both statutes include within their scope commercial retail
establishments,216 the statutes should offer inducement to retailers and dis-
tributors contemplating an operation within the urban core area. As in most
of the other statutes, however, manufacturing risks are excluded in Massachu-
setts.217 Manufacturing risks are not specifically excluded in the District of
Columbia and it appears that they may be underwritten along with other
commercial risks if the facility so desires."
c. The Pennsylvania and Illinois Statutes. The Pennsylvania Fair
Plan Act2" has the most extensive procedural provisions and is the most
explicit of the property insurance plans under review. The statute is pat-
terned after the federal statute and contains all the mandatory provisions
of the federal statute.22° Any property owner or tenant who cannot obtain
fire and extended coverage insurance through regular channels may apply
to the placement facility, directly or through a broker. 22' An inspection will
then be made free of charge by an independent inspection bureau.' The
inspection report is sent to the facility and the facility forwards it to the
member insurers." Those requesting coverage will be notified promptly
whether the property is insurable in its present condition or whether certain
213 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1206 (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909,
2911-12.
2t4 Id. § 1206(c) (1), TJ.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2912. Although the statute
does not specifically prohibit direct underwriting, it is concerned primarily with the
reinsurance of risks from members of the facility. Since there is no authorization in the
statute for direct underwriting, it is doubtful whether the association could legally engage
in this activity.
215 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 269, § 8 (1959).
216 District of Columbia Insurance Placement Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204(b)
(Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2909, 2910; Urban Area Insurance Place-
ment Facility, ch. 731, § 1, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588 (1968)) (by implica-
tion).
217 Ch. 731, § 1, 1968 Mass. Laws (Mass. Leg. Serv. 588 (1968)).
218 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1204(b) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2909, 2910.
218 Act 233, 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592 (1968)).
220 Act 233, § 202, 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 595-97 (1968)).
221 Id . § 202 (I ) (Pa. Leg. Serv, 592, 595 (1968)).
222 Id.
223 Id. § 202(3) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 595 (1968)).
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improvements must be made. 224
 Besides placing risks with insurance com-
panies, the facility is also authorized to assume and cede reinsurance.225
The Pennsylvania statute has the most comprehensive notification and
recordkeeping requirements of all those examined. If insurance is refused or
conditioned on completion of specified improvements, the applicant must be
furnished with a copy of the inspection and action reports. 225 The insurer
must also advise the applicant of his right of appeal to the insurance corn-
missioner.227
 Written notice must be given to any person insured on the
normal market or under the plan at least 20 days prior to the cancella-
tion or nonrenewal of insurance on any risk eligible under the plan, 228 and
the notice must inform the person of procedures for obtaining insurance under
the plan.223
 The inspection bureau and placement facility must file with the
insurance commissioner annual reports regarding its transactions during the
year .23°
The unique feature of the Pennsylvania statute is its creation of the
Pennsylvania Civil Disorder Authority,231
 which is similar to the New
Jersey Insurance Development Fund and which will qualify insurers in
Pennsylvania for federal reinsurance. The Authority, which will be authorized
to make such payments as may be required by the federal reinsurance facil-
ity,232 will be financed primarily by the issuance of special bonds 233 and by
an annual assessment of all property insurers within the state. 234 In this re-
gard, it is subject to the same criticism as the New Jersey Insurance De-
velopment Fund, that is, that the state, through its failure to use general tax
revenues, is not actively participating in the financial backup plan. Another
problem with the assessment system is that the added cost of underwriting
property insurance will make this business even more unattractive.
The Pennylvania plan in conjunction with the federal statute should
provide the necessary spreading of risks. Although the statute does not offer
strong deterrent measures, a municipal liability statute is in effect in three
counties. 2"5 The incentive to improve property is built into the act by the
provision for conditional acceptances, 2" Also, the Pennsylvania plan of opera-
224 Id. § 202(4) (Pa. Leg. Serv. .592, 596 (1968)).
225 Id. §§ 203(a) (2), (3) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 597 (1968)).
226 Id. § 202(4) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 596 (1968)). The applicant may also obtain
a copy of the inspection report prior to any decision on insuring the risk if he so re-
quests. Id. § 202(3) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 595 (1968)).
227 Id .
 § 202(4) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 596 (1968)). An applicant may appeal within
30 days after any ruling or decision of the inspection bureau or placement facility
to the commissioner. Id. § 208(a) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 598 (1968)).
228 id .
 § 202(9) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 596 (1968)). Although this section is appar-
ently aimed at persons presently insured in the normal market, a literal interpretation
would make the section applicable to persons insured under the plan.
229 Id .
230 Id. § 206 (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 597 (1968)).
231 Id. § 301 (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 598 (1968)).
232 Id. 1 304(a) (1) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 599 (1968)).
233 Id. §§ 304(b) (3), 306 (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 599, 600 (1968)).
234 Id. §§ 401-02 (Pa. Leg. Serv. 602, 603 (1968)). The assessment will be 2% of the
aggregate gross premiums received by all property insurers within the state. Id.
235
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §§ 11821-26 (1956).
235 Act 233, § 202(4), 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 596 (1968)).
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tion enables insurers to assess reasonable surcharges for unsafe conditions. 237
The surcharge must be removed upon the correction of the unsafe condi-
tion. 2"5
 The statute, by inclusion of some commercial risks within its opera-
tion,'" offers inducement to retailers contemplating the operation of a busi-
ness within the urban core area. Although this statute is far from perfect,
it is the best overall solution adopted by a state legislature.
The Illinois statute is very similar to the Pennsylvania statute; the only
major difference is its failure to enumerate all the procedures and safe-
guards listed in the Pennsylvania statute. The other difference is that Illinois
differentiates between the placement facility and the reinsurance association, 24°
whereas Pennsylvania encompasses the functions of these two bodies within
its placement facility. 241
In order to qualify for federal reinsurance, Illinois has established an
Insurance Development Fund. Its function is to reimburse the federal
government as required by the federal statute.242
 Unlike the provision for the
Pennsylvania Civil Disorder Authority, however, the Illinois provisions do
not mention the manner in which the Fund will be financed. The Illinois
statute in combination with the federal statute should provide sufficient
spreading of the risk of loss. Since Illinois does not provide explicitly for
conditional acceptance, it offers little incentive for the improvement of property.
Illinois, unlike Pennsylvania, excludes manufacturing risks from coverage, 243
and thus offers no inducement for the construction of industrial plants within
the urban core area. Finally, Illinois, unlike Pennsylvania, has no municipal
liability statute. Consequently, the plan contains no effective deterrent
measures.
3. The Michigan Statute.—The Michigan statute is unique in that it
allows authorized insurers within the state to promulgate a voluntary plan of
operation which, if accepted by the insurance commissioner, would temporarily
forestall the establishment of the pooling arrangement. 244 If a voluntary plan
is not approved or if the operation of the plan is unsuccessful, the insurance
commissioner has the authority to implement the mandatory pooling arrange-
ment.245 The pooling arrangement is very similar to the one established in New
237 Id. § 202(4) (Pa. Leg, Serv. 592, 596 (1968)). See note 156 supra.
238 Id. § 202(4) (1) (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 596 (1968)).
239 The statute specifically includes manufacturing risks unless excluded
	 by	 the
commissioner and by implication includes other commercial risks. Id. § 103(2) (Pa. Leg.
Serv. 592, 593 (1968)).
249 Urban Property Insurance, Act 1840, §§ 525-26, 1968 III. Acts (III. Leg. Serv. 13,
14 (Smith-Hurd 1968)). The reinsurance association's function in Illinois is to assume
and cede reinsurance on risks written by insurers in conformity with the program of the
placement facility. Unlike the facility in Pennsylvania, it will not be able to underwrite
risks directly from the property owners. In this respect, it is similar to the Joint Under-
writing Association in the District of Columbia. However, it differs from the latter in
that the District of Columbia association will not be operational until the insurance
commissioner decides that the placement facility is net adequate. Sec p. 680 supra.
241 Act 233, § 201, 1968 Pa. Laws (Pa. Leg. Serv. 592, 594-95 (1968)).
242
 Act 1840, § 529 (Ill. Leg. Serv. 13, 15 (Smith-Hurd 1968)).
243 Id. § 523(1) (III. Leg. Serv. 13 (Smith-Hurd 1968)).
244
 P.A. 262, § 24.12950, 1968 Mich. Public Acts (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material
497, 506-07 (1968)).
245 Id.
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York,24° except that the Michigan pool may designate any of its members as
servicing facilities.247 These facilities will be able to insure policies in lieu of
the pool. 48
 The servicing facilities are also allowed to reinsure any eligible risks
with the pool itself.24°
The procedural safeguards in the Michigan statute are sound. An inde-
pendent inspection bureau is established 250
 and a copy of the inspection report
of the bureau must be made available to the applicant upon request. 2" If the
pool determines that an applicant's property is not an acceptable risk, the
applicant is entitled to a written statement setting forth the conditions which
prevent it from constituting an acceptable risk and the measures which must
be taken in order to qualify the property:252 The statute thus offers the
requisite incentive for improving property within the core area.
One of the shortcomings of the Michigan statute is its limitation on the
amount of business in which the pool or its servicing facilities can engage. 253
Once this limit has been reached, property owners are once again left to the
uncertainties of the normal market.
The Michigan statute does not exclude manufacturing or commercial
risks and thus offers a stimulus to the operation of such enterprises in the
core areas. If the pool utilizes federal reinsurance, it should provide sufficient
spreading of the risk of loss. However, because there is no municipal liability
statute in Michigan there are no effective deterrent measures.
VIII. A PROPOSAL
In this final section, a plan will be proposed which attempts to incor-
porate the best features of the state and federal statutes previously examined.
This plan considers the four substantive factors: spreading, deterrence, in-
centives to improve property and inducements to attract capital investments
in urban core areas, and attempts to achieve the proper balance between
them. The plan also includes the constitutional and procedural safeguards
necessary to assure the fair treatment of both insurance companies and
property owners within the state.
At the local level, a system of municipal liability should be codified, for
only when a financial impact is felt within the riot-affected city will measures
be taken to prevent recurrence of violence. Any person suffering property
damage within the city as a result of rioting should recover from the munici-
pality a sum equal to the replacement value of the damage or 10 percent of the
fair market value of the property, whichever is less: 254
 A claimant should
240 See p. 673 supra.
247 Id. § 24.12920(3) (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 500 (1968)).
248 Id.
249 Id. § 24.12939 (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 505 (1968)) (by im-
plication).
250 Id. § 24.12901 (b) (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497 (1968) ).
251 Id.
	 24.12910(3) (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 498 (1968)).
252 Id.
 § 24.12925(3) (Mich. Stat. Ann, Current Material 497, 501 (1968)).
253 Id. § 24.12931 (Mich. Stat. Ann. Current Material 497, 504-05 (1968)). The
annual premiums written directly by the pool or on its behalf by the servicing facilities
shall not "exceed 10% of the aggregate premiums used as the basis for determining
participation ratios in the pool."
254
 Also the total liability of the municipality should be limited to $10,000 times
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not have to allege and prove negligence of the municipality; recovery will be
absolute as long as the claimant did not participate in the violence or was
not contributorily negligent in failing to mitigate his damages. The arbitrary
distinctions between riots, insurrections and rebellions should be abolished,
and a riot should be considered in existence when three or more persons to-
gether, and in a violent or tumultuous manner, assemble to do an unlawful
act which disturbs the public peace.
Another predicate for recovery against the municipality should be that
the damaged property be in insurable condition prior to the riot. A property
owner wishing to qualify for this municipal liability coverage should be re-
quired to have the building code department in the city conduct an inspec-
tion of the premises once a year to determine whether the property is insur-
able.255 It is necessary that the property be insurable so that a property owner
will not rely entirely upon the municipal liability statute for protection against
riots. This plan will offer incentive to the property owner to maintain and
improve his property, for he will be eligible for municipal liability coverage
only if his property is insurable. Finally, the requirement that the building
code department conduct the inspections will result in closer enforcement of
city ordinances.
In order to take full advantage of the deterrent effect of the statute,
insurance companies or pools should be subrogated to any rights which an
insured property owner has against the city under the municipal liability act.
It is preferable that disputed claims be submitted to an impartial arbitra-
tion association (such as the American Arbitration Association) which will
determine whether the claimant is entitled to recover and, if so, the amount
of recovery. In arbitration proceedings, disputes are decided swiftly and in-
expensively. The expenses of arbitration, including attorneys' fees, should be
borne by the city unless the arbitrator determines that the claim is frivolous.
There should be no right to appeal the arbitrator's decision.
Coincident with the municipal liability system, the state should create
a financing system which will reimburse a municipality for a varying per-
centage of its losses under the municipal liability statute. This percentage
should vary from year to year directly with the amount of riot damage within
the city during the year, the quality and quantity of preventive measures
taken by the city,25G and the fiscal status of the city. There are at least three
reasons supporting such a system. First, it will provide a spreading of the
risk of loss. Second, it will offer cities an incentive to implement preventive
measures. Finally, it will prevent a complete depletion of a city's treasury. 257
the number of claimants per riot. If this maximum liability is reached as a result of a
particular riot, the proceeds should be distributed pro rata. The reason for the total
liability and the maximum liability of the city for an individual claim is the prevention
of municipal bankruptcy. See p. 659 supra.
235 The standards of insurability should be determined by the state insurance com-
missioner and should be applied to municipal liability inspections, as well as to insurance
inspections. In this regard, it may be necessary for some cities to revise their ordinances
defining building code violations.
256 E.g., increased police protection and better fire prevention techniques.
257 The ultimate solution to the fiscal dilemma of cities is the concept of regional
government. Large cities, such as Philadelphia, have been ". . shouldering the entire
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Aside from municipal and state liability, states should create mandatory
pooling associations of all licensed property insurers within the state. These
pools should underwrite any insurable property within the state, regardless of
the location of the property or the frequency of riots within the area. In-
spections should be conducted at no cost to the property owner and an inde-
pendent inspection bureau should inspect the property to determine its insur-
ability. All denials of coverage should be conditional, unless the owner repre-
sents a significant moral risk 258
 or the property is beyond repair. Once the
insurability of the property has been determined by the inspection bureau,
the risk should be written by the pool for a period of one year. The policy
provided by the pool should cover all property damage, including, but not
limited to, damage caused by rioting.259 The consideration for the policy
should be normal insurance rates, that is, those existing in the same city for
that type of property outside the urban core area. The pool should not be
allowed to use surcharges for hazardous conditions. If the property is in poor
condition, a conditional acceptance should be given unless the property is
irreparable. 26° In order to lower the cost of such a pool, deductibles and per-
centage participation clauses might prove feasible. In fact, the amount of
the deductible could vary to reflect the loss experience of the property owner.
Before a person should be eligible for coverage by the pool, he should
be required to present documented proof to the inspection bureau that he
has been denied coverage in the normal market. Perhaps two or three written
rejections would satisfy this requirement. Although the normal market today
will underwrite very few of the risks in the urban core area, it is hoped that
in the near future the normal market will replace the pool as the primary
source of insurance coverage. This development might occur as the threat of
riots diminish and as the property within the area becomes less vulnerable
financial burden of regional improvements, benefits that accrue quite as much to the
surrounding suburbs as to the inner city." The Boston Globe, February 17, 1969, at 4, col.
1. Regional government would enable the municipalities to expand their tax base to include
the contiguous suburban areas where most of the affluent homeowners presently reside.
This expansion of the tax base should have two immediate results. It would (1) increase
municipal revenue to pay for expenses and (2) enable the cities to maintain or decrease
the present real estate tax rates, and thus diminish or end the exodus by taxpayers. Ad-
mittedly, the concept of regional government is far from a reality and there are con-
siderable legal and practical difficulties obstructing its implementation. It would require
amendment of state constitutions, and it is likely that residents of the suburban areas
would strongly resist such reform. Also, it is likely that the political leaders (mayors,
aldermen, selectmen, etc.) of the suburban cities and towns will resist any attempt to
dilute their power base. It would appear, however, that regional government is the
ultimate solution and that state and federal subsidies are amelioratives which will not
solve the modern municipal fiscal problem.
2 " E.g., persons who are known arsonists and persons who have previously de-
frauded insurance companies.
2" For the definition of riot, see p. 685 supra.
260 If property is in poor condition, it is better to grant a conditional acceptance
at normal rates than to accept the property in its present condition with a surcharge.
One of the purposes of the inspection system is to provide incentives for property owners
to rectify dangerous conditions. Moreover, for this purpose, accepting the risk with a sur-
charge is not as effective as a conditional acceptance.
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to fire. The proposed system, in conjunction with other poverty programs,
will hasten the return to a normal insurance market.
One of the most important components of a viable pooling arrangement
is the maintenance of precise actuarial statistics. The insurance commissioner
within each state should closely monitor the system and require the pool to
compile all types of relevant statistics. Such statistics could be utilized by
the pools to alter their present underwriting standards if these standards do
not accurately reflect the incidence of loss. The statistics will also inform the
companies of the time when it becomes profitable to insure these risks through
the normal market.
In this system, the basic provisions of the federal reinsurance program
would be employed to supplement the state and local measures and to spread
the losses nationwide. If the pool is unable to obtain reinsurance through
normal channels, it should be able to reinsure all losses within the urban core
area by payment of a reasonable premium to the federal government. The
present federal reinsurance statute limits reinsurance coverage to losses caused
by riots; 201
 however, it should cover all losses regardless of the cause. The
plan utilized in the federal statute for distributing risks among the insurance
companies, states, and federal pool should be implemented in the proposed
system.262
 As the situation in urban core areas improves, the federal reinsur-
ance system should be phased out and more responsibility placed upon state
and local programs.
IX. CONCLUSION
The insurance problem in urban core areas, like other problems indige-
nous to the area, is not amenable to easy solutions. The recent enactment of
the federal reinsurance program and of the state plans is a step toward solution.
As noted earlier, these state statutes contain many infirmities needful of cure
by the plans of operation before they will become viable and effective insur-
ance schemes. Since federal reinsurance is available only to insurers doing
business within states that have insurance plans acceptable to HUD, insurers
in other states will still be unable to obtain reinsurance for riot risks. Further-
more, the federal . and state statutes are merely stopgap measures reflecting
a response to the widespread rioting which has occurred in recent years. In
particular, the restriction of federal reinsurance to riot risks reflects a failure
by Congress to recognize the enduring causes of the insurance problem in urban
core areas.
The implementation of an insurance scheme such as the one proposed
should provide a strong foundation upon which other poverty programs can
be built. The relation between the lack of insurance and other urban problems
must be recognized, and modifications and full adaptations in the proposed
scheme should be made when necessary to mesh the insurance plan with other
poverty programs.
ALAN S. KAPLINSKY
261 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1222(b) (Aug. 1, 1968), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2894, 2901.
262 See p. 664 supra,
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